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ARTICLE
Kevin H. Michels
The Corporate Attorney as “Internal” Gatekeeper and the In
Pari Delicto Defense: A Proposed New Standard
Abstract. This Article begins by proposing a distinction between the
corporate lawyer’s “internal” and “external” gatekeeping role in order to focus
on the special challenge posed by the former. As internal gatekeeper, the
corporation lawyer is charged with the restraint of the corporation’s executives
and other employees to prevent harm to the lawyer’s corporation client. The
external gatekeeper, by contrast, restrains the client to prevent harm to third
parties. While each gatekeeping role presents challenges in defining the duties
and liability of attorneys, the internal-gatekeeping role is subject to a special
defense that can insulate attorneys from liability. Attorneys can interpose an
in pari delicto defense to corporation claims for malpractice, arguing that
knowledge of the executive’s wrongdoing should be imputed to the
corporation and, as a result, the latter should be barred from recovery because
it is “equally or more culpable” than the failed attorney gatekeeper. To date,
courts have struggled to determine when executive wrongdoing should be
imputed to the corporation, and whether and how to craft exceptions to
accommodate the divergent goals of holding corporations accountable for
their agents’ wrongdoing, while incentivizing lawyers to perform properly as
internal gatekeepers.
This Article proposes what it terms the “gatekeeper-imputation” exception
to the general rule that knowledge of the executive’s wrongdoing should be
imputed to the corporation when attorneys seek to interpose an in pari delicto
defense to allegations of malpractice by a corporate client. When the law firm
has expressly or impliedly assumed an obligation to identify or report
employee wrongdoing, then information that would have been discovered had
318
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the law firm fulfilled that obligation, should not be imputed to the
corporation for purposes of the in pari delicto defense. Whether the attorney
has assumed a gatekeeping role, in turn, should be informed by the express
agreements of the corporation and law firm, and in the absence of such
agreement, the ethical and statutory gatekeeping duties typically imposed on
counsel. The proposed standard will respect the normative basis for
imputation, while optimizing the gatekeeping incentives of the corporation
and the law firm.
Author.
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INTRODUCTION
The vision of the corporation attorney as “gatekeeper” has gained
currency in recent years, even if the precise contours of that role remain
less than clear. At a minimum, the lawyer-gatekeeper serves as a voice of
client restraint in preventing wrongdoing as a part of her commitment to
the client, third parties, and the legal order. Although “gatekeeping” often
entails restraining the corporation client to protect third parties who might
be harmed by the client’s wrongdoing,1 it also includes a lawyer’s effort to
prevent harm to the corporation client.2 While we speak in broad strokes
about gatekeeping, a single term applied to the lawyer’s prevention of
wrongdoing obscures a critical distinction: as a result of the in pari delicto
defense discussed below, the legal standards for recovery against a lawyer
for failure in the gatekeeping role vary dramatically, depending on whether
the party alleging harm is the corporation client or a third party.
This Article begins by offering a new taxonomy to refine our
understanding of the corporate lawyer’s gatekeeping role. It distinguishes
between “internal” gatekeeping—designed to protect the corporation
client from harm—and “external” gatekeeping—in which the lawyer seeks
1. E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant
Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 304 (2004) (describing gatekeepers as “the professionals who serve
investors by preparing, verifying, or certifying corporate disclosures to the securities markets”).
2. E.g., Rutheford B Campbell, Jr. & Eugene R. Gaetke, The Ethical Obligation of Transactional
Lawyers to Act As Gatekeepers, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 9, 9 (2003) (discussing lawyer gatekeeping and
focusing on “the lawyer’s duty to take action within the corporation to protect the corporate client
from harm and restrict the lawyer’s participation in the corporate manager’s misconduct”).
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to prevent the corporation or its actors from harming third parties. After
distinguishing the internal and external gatekeeping roles, this Article turns
to a distinctive challenge posed by the internal-gatekeeping role. In certain
instances, the lawyer who fails in her duty to protect the client harms the
corporation through a breach of the duty of care. If the corporation is to
be made whole, and the incentives for internal gatekeeping are to be
optimized, the corporation must—in certain circumstances—have the
right to recover damages resulting from the lawyer’s breach. The
corporation’s recovery for malpractice for this failed gatekeeping role will
be far from straightforward, however. The corporation client that sues its
own lawyer for failure in the gatekeeper role will face the centuries-old,
equitable defense of in pari delicto. In pari delicto or “in equal fault” bars a
plaintiff from recovering against a tortfeasor when the plaintiff’s
wrongdoing was equal to or greater than the defendant’s.3
The defense itself seems sensible in the traditional setting of attorney
and client: it is grounded on the equitable notion that courts should not
compensate the client for his own intentional or criminal wrongdoing.4
The defense takes a curious turn, however, when the malpractice plaintiff
is a corporation whose executive has committed fraud or other
wrongdoing, and the defendant is the lawyer who failed to discover or
report this information to the corporation client.5 Citing agency law
principles, courts have imputed knowledge of the wrongful acts of the
executive to the corporation.6 As a result, courts have held that the
corporation whose executive committed the crime or fraud is equally or
more guilty than the attorney who failed to discover or report the
wrongdoing, thereby shielding the attorney from corporate claims for
malpractice under the in pari delicto defense.7 Thus understood, the in
3. See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306 (1985) (defining the
common law defense in pari delicto); Nisselson v. Lernout, 469 F.3d 143, 151 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting
in pari delicto bars “plaintiffs from recovering damages resulting from their own wrongdoing”); Am.
Trade Partners, LP v. A–1 Int’l Importing Enters., Ltd., 770 F. Supp. 273, 276 (E.D. Pa. 1991)
(using in pari delicto to determine whether recovery of damages is barred).
4. See Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 306 (noting that it is inequitable to “mediat[e] disputes
among wrongdoers”); Am. Trade Partners, LP, 770 F. Supp. at 276 (explaining in pari delicto).
5. See Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 453 (7th Cir. 1982) (asking whether
the defendant is “entitled to use the wrongdoing of Cenco’s managers as a defense against the charges
of breach of contract, professional malpractice, and fraud”).
6. See id. at 456 (noting that the jury was instructed that it could attribute management fraud
on behalf of the corporation to the corporations); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of
Allegheny Health Educ. & Research Found. v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 989 A.2d 313, 325
(Pa. 2010) (recognizing that many courts impute fraud by management to the corporation).
7. See Cenco, 686 F.2d at 456 (holding that Cenco is unable to claim in pari delicto);
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 989 A.2d at 325 (deciding Cenco is unable to claim in pari delicto).
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pari delicto defense can insulate counsel from civil accountability for failing
to detect or take actions to prevent the intentional or criminal wrongdoing
of executives.
Corporations may expect—if not expressly retain counsel to serve in the
gatekeeper function—in part to prevent executives from involving the
corporation in fraudulent or criminal activities. Should the in pari delicto
defense categorically eliminate the right of corporations to rely on
attorneys in fulfilling their ethical and statutory duties to prevent executive
wrongdoing? Is this the price we must pay for a coherent in pari delicto
defense? And if so, is the corporate attorney really an internal gatekeeper
by any measure that matters?
Part I will begin by distinguishing the internal and external gatekeeping
roles, and ground the discussion by offering examples of the archetypal
internal-gatekeeping failure—the corporate attorney who breaches a duty
to investigate, discover or report an executive’s criminal or fraudulent
wrongdoing.8 Part II will examine the corporation lawyer’s ethical duties
in these circumstances—since such duties will prove relevant under the
proposal that is offered later in this Article. Part II will next ask whether
the corporate client could make out a prima facie malpractice case against
the lawyer on these facts, exploring the critical relation between ethical
breaches by counsel and claims for malpractice.
Part III will examine how the corporation’s case against its dutybreaching attorney would fare under the in pari delicto defense. It will
provide an overview of the defense, its development generally and in
connection with claims against gatekeepers—attorneys and others—in the
corporate setting. The central question, it turns out, is when the
wrongdoing of the executive should be imputed to the corporation,
thereby rendering the corporation subject to the in pari delicto defense.
Part III will provide a sketch of approaches that courts have fashioned on
the imputation question, parsing them into three categories for discussion
purposes. Part IV will explore the tensions posed by the sometimes
conflicting goals of imputation and gatekeeping that are galvanized by the
in pari delicto defense.
Part V will seek to reconcile those competing goals into a new
8. We will focus on the hypotheticals of this kind because in many ways they are the archetypal
gatekeeping failure, and the criminal or fraudulent nature of the wrongdoing directly implicates the
in pari delicto defense. There are, of course, other scenarios in which the attorney’s failures to prevent
client wrongdoing could harm the corporation—the failure to prevent breaches of fiduciary duty, for
example. Because in pari delicto is an equitable defense, and given the delicate distinctions that
inform our analysis of when it should and should not apply, the reader should not assume that the
analysis here applies without qualification to other attorney internal-gatekeeper failings.
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imputation exception focused on whether the lawyer has expressly or
impliedly assumed gatekeeping duties. This “gatekeeper-imputation
exception” will invite courts to respect any express agreement between the
corporation and the law firm with respect to the latter’s gatekeeping duties
and, in the absence of such agreement, to isolate attorney ethical or
statutory gatekeeping failures as those that should not be subject to
imputation. Part V will apply the test across the range of hypotheticals
introduced in Part I, and explain why the proposed test respects the
normative basis for imputation, while optimizing the gatekeeping
incentives of the corporation and the law firm.
I. THE PROBLEM: CONTEXT AND CHALLENGES
A. The Internal and External Gatekeeping Roles
When corporation employees engage in wrongdoing, the victims are
often legion—the corporation itself, the shareholders, and third parties
who were harmed by the wrongdoing. In certain instances, the
corporation attorney, as gatekeeper, must take action to prevent
wrongdoing by the corporation client. When she fails to take such action
despite an obligation to do so, those who are harmed may seek recovery
against the lawyer.
The challenges posed by claims against lawyers for failings in the
gatekeeping role can vary considerably depending on who brings the claim.
When those who are not a party to the attorney–client relationship sue the
attorney, courts have struggled with whether and when to allow such
claims. Claims by non-clients or third parties are challenging in part
because they may, if recognized, create obligations that undermine the
attorney’s duties to her client. In earlier works, I have explained the
external-gatekeeping challenges at length.9 When the client sues the
attorney for failures in the gatekeeping role, the analysis differs radically.
Here, we are less concerned with the tensions posed by competing
obligations: the duty to the client is readily recognized under basic
malpractice principles. Instead, we face a distinctive barrier to analysis of
the malpractice claim against the lawyer for failed gatekeeping. If the
9. See Kevin H. Michels, Third-Party Negligence Claims Against Counsel: A Proposed Unified
Liability Standard, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 143, 159–69 (2009) (proposing a test to determine
when attorneys should be liable for negligence to nonclients); see also Kevin H. Michels, Lawyer
Independence: From Ideal to Viable Legal Standard, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 85, 111–20 (2010)
(arguing that the lawyer’s independent requirements of the Rules of Professional Conduct are
designed to prevent the client from harming third parties).
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wrongdoing is that of a corporate employee, should we ascribe knowledge
of the wrongdoing to the corporation? If so, should the corporation’s
“knowledge” bar it from suing its own attorney?
Given the distinct challenges posed by claims against gatekeepers, we
might profitably parse the gatekeeping role into two categories: internal
and external. The internal-gatekeeping role concerns protection of the
client against wrongdoing caused by its employees. Often these corporate
employees will harm third parties through criminal or fraudulent behavior,
and the third party will sue the corporation for damages resulting from
such wrongful behavior. Even though a third party is involved, the
corporation may seek recovery against its lawyer for failure to discover or
report the executive wrongdoing that lead to its liability to a third party.
Because the claim is one of malpractice by the corporation against its own
lawyer for failure to take action that lead to the corporation’s losses, I will
characterize this as internal-gatekeeping question.
The externalgatekeeping role concerns the lawyer’s protection of third parties, i.e.,
those other than the client, against the wrongdoing of the corporation and
its representatives. While there is clearly overlap between the internal and
external-gatekeeping roles, they are sharply distinct in terms of who seeks
relief against the lawyer—the corporation client or the third party.
In this Article, I propose to examine a central challenge posed by the
internal-gatekeeping role—asking when we should ascribe the wrongdoing
of the corporate representative to the entity itself, and whether such
knowledge should bar corporations from suing their attorneys for failure in
the internal-gatekeeping role. To ground our discussion, I will offer some
examples of the failed internal-gatekeeping role below.
B. Internal Gatekeeping Failures: Examples
The troubling behavior often begins with the rogue executive—the
CEO, President, Vice President, or executive below the officer rank who
engages in wrongdoing of some kind or another. The gatekeeping
problem concerns the corporation lawyer’s knowledge, discovery, or
reporting of the executive’s wrongdoing. In each of the examples that
follow, we will assume that the corporation has no actual knowledge of the
executive’s wrongdoing. The question in each of the examples is whether
the law firm should bear liability for its failure to discover or report the
executive’s wrongdoing to the board of directors of the corporation.
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Hypothetical A: The “Knowing” but Silent Attorney
Mary Roberts, outside counsel to Fast Pharma, Inc. (“Fast”), learns that
four individuals have suffered strokes during the clinical trials of the
company’s memory-improvement medicine. Division Vice President Joe
Davis instructs Roberts not to list the four “adverse” events in its periodic
reporting to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Roberts advises
Davis that nondisclosure is unlawful, and states that he will handle the
filings himself. Roberts does not participate in the periodic company
reporting, but takes no other action to prevent the false filings. After
additional injuries, an investigation discovers that the company withheld
information from the FDA, and a criminal indictment and personal injury
actions are lodged against the company. Fast sues Roberts and her firm.
Hypothetical B: The Reckless or Willfully Blind Attorney
In scenario A, assume instead that Davis has told Mary nothing about
the adverse events, but that Mary learns of allegations suggesting such
wrongdoing. She intentionally chooses not to ask follow-up questions, on
the theory that she might turn suspicion into “knowledge” of wrongdoing
and therefore be required to report on the executive’s wrongful design.
She files the FDA report, which lists no adverse events. The corporation
later discovers that the company withheld information from the FDA, and
a criminal indictment and personal injury actions are lodged against the
company. Fast sues Roberts and her firm.
Hypothetical C: The Negligent Attorney
In scenario A, assume instead that Mary has no knowledge of the
adverse events, but hears a rumor suggesting such wrongdoing. She
negligently (let us assume) fails to ask follow-up questions, and files the
reporting document with the FDA, which lists no adverse events. The
corporation later discovers that the company withheld information from
the FDA, and a criminal indictment and personal injury actions are lodged
against the company. Fast sues Roberts and her firm.
Hypothetical D: The Negligent Investigator
In scenario C, assume instead that Mary has no knowledge of the
adverse events, and that the corporation, having received an anonymous
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tip on the employee hotline, suspects that some adverse advents may not
have been reported. Fast hires Roberts and her law firm to conduct an
internal investigation. Roberts and her firm conduct the investigation
negligently and discover no wrongdoing. Fast completes its filing without
disclosing any adverse events. Fast later discovers that it withheld
information from the FDA, and a criminal indictment and personal injury
actions are lodged against the company. Fast sues Roberts and her firm.
While the particulars vary, each hypothetical describes instances in
which failings by corporate attorneys are connected with a harm suffered
by the company. In each instance, the corporate executive has engaged in
intentional wrongdoing, and counsel failed to take action that likely would
have prevented the wrongdoing. In the second and third scenarios, the
attorney not only failed to prevent the wrongdoing, she engaged in
affirmative efforts to further the fraud—witting or otherwise.
Hypothetical E: The Thieving CEO
Consider a new scenario. Attorney Roberts knows or has reason to
know that Division Vice President Joe Davis owns a dummy corporation
that, unbeknownst to others at Fast, is receiving payments from Fast. She
does not advise the President or the board of the wrongdoing. Upon
discovering Davis’s theft, Fast sues Roberts and her firm.
In each of the examples, we are focused on whether the corporation can
bring a claim against the lawyer for failure to prevent some portion of the
losses that would have been prevented by the lawyer’s disclosure to officials
who were higher up within the organization. Our question here is not
whether the attorney breached a duty by failing to disclose to parties
beyond the corporation, such as shareholders who might have prevented the
fraud or potential victims who might have avoided the harm with the
benefit of notice.10 By restricting our inquiry to this question, we isolate
the central challenge posed by corporate malpractice claims against lawyers
who fail in the internal-gatekeeping role: the lawyer’s interposition of the
in pari delicto defense.11 The defense will assert that the wrongdoing of
10. These are important gatekeeping questions, of course, but they are outside the scope of this
Article, which isolates the “internal gatekeeping” questions in order to explore the in pari delicto
defense.
11. A valuable scholarly treatment of attorney gatekeeper liability is found in George C. Harris,
Taking the Entity Theory Seriously: Lawyer Liability for Failure to Prevent Harm to Organizational
Clients Through Disclosure of Constituent Wrongdoing, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 597 (1998). That
piece considers attorney liability not only for failings in what I term the “internal” gatekeeping role,
but also for failures to disclose beyond the corporation. The breadth of the article prevents Professor
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the executive should be imputed to the corporation, even though the latter
is—we shall assume—unaware of the wrongdoing. Before we consider the
defense, however, it would be helpful to analyze the propriety of the
attorney’s behavior in each instance under the ethics rules and legal
malpractice standards.
II. THE PRIMA FACIE CASE AGAINST COUNSEL
In this section, we will examine the nature of the attorney’s wrongdoing
in each of the hypotheticals offered in Part I, and ask whether the
corporation can make a prima facie case of malpractice prior to
interposition of the in pari delicto defense. I will begin by offering a brief
overview of the relationship between a breach of the legal ethics rules and
malpractice. Thereafter, I will examine the attorney’s behavior under the
attorney ethics rules. I will then consider the legal malpractice standards in
light of the ethics analysis and the more general duties of care imposed on
attorneys. Later in this Article, the ethics analysis will return to center
stage in explaining how the courts should evaluate the in pari delicto
defense.12
A. The Ethics Rules
As a general rule, a breach of the attorney ethics rules is not the basis for
a cause of action against counsel for malpractice. The ethics rules can,
however, provide evidence of the duty of care owed to the client.
Accordingly, a breach of the ethics rules is evidence of a breach of the duty
of care in a malpractice matter brought by the client against counsel.
Thus, a critical threshold question is whether the attorneys violated the
attorney ethics rules in the hypotheticals offered in Part I.
We will begin with Rule 1.13(b) of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct,13 which is worth quoting in its entirety:
Harris from engaging in an extended analysis of the in pari delicto question addressed here, which he
in passing suggests should be treated as “a matter of duty and causation.” Id. at 631. In Part V.
subsection A., I argue that a duty of care analysis alone is insufficient, and propose a new test by
which to determine when imputation is inappropriate, focusing on the importance of the lawyer’s
gatekeeping role in the corporation’s overall monitoring efforts.
12. See infra Part V., subsection A.
13. The American Bar Association promulgated the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in
1983, and has amended them frequently thereafter. CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY AM. BAR
ASS’N, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2013). Forty-nine states have adopted
some version of the Model Rules, often with amendments. See ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 51:303–04 at 247 (Mar. 31, 2010) (providing an overview of state
variations of ABA Model Rules). California is also considering adoption of the Model Rules. See
Proposed Rules of Professional Conduct, THE ST. BAR OF CAL., http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/
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If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other
person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act[,]
or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of
a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that reasonably
might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in
substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is
reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the
lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the
organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in
the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances to the highest
authority that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by
applicable law.14

The lawyer in hypothetical A knew that an officer or other employee
(Davis) was about to act wrongfully.15 The question is whether the
wrongdoing is of the type identified by Model Rule 1.13 as reason for
action by the lawyer.
Under Model Rule 1.13(b), the question is whether the executive
intended to (or did) (1) violate “a legal obligation to” the corporation, or
(2) violate a “law that reasonably might be imputed” to the corporation,
which (3) is likely to result in substantial injury to the corporation.16 In
A, the attorney was about to withhold critical safety information from the
FDA, a violation of FDA regulations17 and a potentially criminal act that
would be imputed to the corporation. Moreover, by engaging in fraud,
even fraud that is not theft from the corporation, the executive may be
violating the fiduciary duty of care owed to the corporation18 and the
implied or express terms of his employment agreement.19
The
Restatement Governing Lawyers provides that an executive “violates a legal
obligation to the organization” by an “act or failure to act . . . that,
although perhaps intended to serve an interest of the organization, will
foreseeably cause injury to the client, such as by exposing the organization
Portals/9/documents/CRRPC/RRC%20Final%20Docs/ProposedRulesofProfessionalConduct01101
4.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2014) (“[T]he State Bar submitted an initial group of proposed Rules of
Professional Conduct to the Supreme Court for approval.”).
14. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2013).
15. Id. R. 1.0(f).
16. Id.
17. 21 C.F.R. § 314(c) (2013).
18. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.42(a) (2002) (imposing duty of care on officers); id.
§ 8.42(b)(2) (requiring officer to report “actual probable violation of material law” to superior officer
or board).
19. Antioch Litig. Trust v. McDermott Will & Emery LLP, 738 F. Supp. 2d 758, 766 (S.D.
Ohio 2010); In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 965 A.2d 763, 777 (Del. Ch. 2009).
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to criminal or civil liability[,]”20 a standard clearly satisfied here.
In addition, the executive’s wrongdoing in A seems likely to visit
substantial harm to the corporation. The nondisclosure could lead to a
criminal charge and expose the corporation to substantial civil liability.
The fraud on the FDA coupled with the presumed continued sales of the
drug made possible by such fraud could lead to massive personal injury
liability.
Thus, it is clear that the executive in A triggered an obligation of the
attorney to act. The lawyer’s obligation is straightforward enough under
Model Rule 1.13. She should have “[referred] the matter to higher
authority within the organization.”21 This is hardly an extraordinary
demand. In A, it would entail advising the Division President or the
Board of Directors. The duty is slight and it presents almost no
countervailing concern: it does, at least in the first instance, require
reporting beyond the corporation, so client confidentiality is not
threatened by the reporting. Moreover, the duty reflects the black letter
law of entity representation: the lawyer owes his duties to the organization,
not the constituents.22 The duty to report to a higher authority in the
organization also aligns with the other ethical duties imposed on
counsel.23 Model Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 1.6(b) allows
reporting beyond the corporation in order to prevent reasonably certain
crime or fraud that will result in substantial injury to another.24 The
lawyer does not perform competently25 or diligently26 if she fails to report
to others within an organization that a constituent is about to expose the
organization to grave harm.27 The lawyer’s silence likewise conflicts with
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. f (2000). The
Restatement comment interprets a standard nearly identical to that contained in Model Rule 1.13(a):
requiring action by the lawyer when the executive “violates a legal obligation to the organization.”
Id.; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2013).
21. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2013).
22. See id. R. 1.13(a) (“A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the
organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.”). Moreover, “a lawyer representing
only an organization does not owe duties of care, diligence, or confidentiality to constituents of the
organization.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. b (2000)
(citations and footnotes omitted).
23. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2013).
24. Id. R. 1.6(b).
25. See id. R. 1.1 (“Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness
and preparation reasonably necessary for representation.”).
26. See id. R. 1.3 (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing
a client.”).
27. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. e (2000) (“A
lawyer is also required to act diligently . . . by taking steps to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm to a
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the lawyer’s communication as well.28
The lawyer’s duty in B is complicated by the lawyer’s reckless disregard
of evidence of the executive’s wrongdoing or willful blindness. We will
assume that the lawyer was “successful” in her efforts to remain ignorant,
and that she does not have “knowledge” as defined by RPC 1.0(f), i.e.,
“actual knowledge of the fact in question.”29 A critical question is
whether this behavior would somehow insulate her from ethical
wrongdoing. I have argued elsewhere that an attorney’s decision to ignore
evidence that arouses reasonable suspicion of client crime or a fraud before
furthering a client transaction violates the attorney’s duty to exercise
independent professional judgment under RPC 2.1.30 The willful
blindness likely violates the duties of competence and diligence as well.
In C and D, the lawyer’s mental state falls below that which would
trigger either a reporting requirement under RPC 1.13 or a duty of further
investigation under RPC 2.1. Although negligent behavior may violate the
duties of competence and diligence, we should be slow to cast all acts of
negligence as ethical breaches. It is true, however, that the attorney in each
of these scenarios has failed her client in a critical gatekeeping sense—by
failing to take reasonable actions that likely would have led to discovery
and prevention of intentional wrongdoing.
In E, the facts have changed substantially. When the lawyer has
knowledge of the executive’s thieving from the corporation, her inaction
and silence are clearly a breach of that Rule 1.13(b).31 When the lawyer’s
mental state falls below knowledge, Rule 1.13(b) would not be triggered,
and thus “reason to know” may fall short of such knowledge, as discussed
earlier.32
B. Malpractice: The Prima-Facie Claim
If the attorneys in at least some, if not all, of our hypotheticals are to be
internal gatekeepers—that is, if they have some duties to protect the
client.”).
28. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (2013) (“A lawyer shall explain a
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding
the representation.”).
29. Id. R. 1.0(f) (“A person’s knowledge can be inferred from circumstances.”); see also id. R.
1.0 cmt. 3 (“As defined in Rule 1.0(f), knowledge can be inferred from circumstances, and a lawyer
cannot ignore the obvious.”).
30. Kevin H. Michels, Lawyer Independence: From Ideal to Viable Legal Standard, 61 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 85, 96 (2010).
31. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2013).
32. Id.; Id. R. 1.0 (f); T. Leigh Anenson, The Triumph of Equity: Equitable Estoppel in Modern
Litigation, 27 REV. LITIG. 377, 399–400 (2008).
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corporation client from the wrongdoing of its executives in certain
instances—then it seems fair to ask whether any financial responsibility
will attach for their dereliction of that duty.33 In this section, we will
consider whether the corporation in our hypotheticals can satisfy the basic
elements of a malpractice claim against counsel. In Part III, we will
explore the in pari delicto defense that counsel would likely interpose in
response to a malpractice claim.
In order to prevail in a malpractice claim against the attorneys in A and
B, the corporations must establish that: (1) the defendant owed the
plaintiff a duty of care; (2) the defendant breached this duty; (3) the
breach was the cause of plaintiff’s harm; and (4) plaintiff suffered
damages.34 The first of these elements is beyond question: the attorney
owes a duty of care to the client simply by dint of the attorney–client
relationship.35 The second element of a malpractice claim often takes
center stage because of the challenges posed by establishing the contents of
the duty owed to the client, and it will be the centerpiece of our discussion
here. The corporations in our hypotheticals will require expert testimony
to establish the content of the duty of care in a malpractice claim.36 The
third and fourth elements are largely fact questions, although our
circumstances pose challenges that warrant mention here.
In the analysis that follows, we will consider both a breach of the ethics
rules and a breach of the standard of care. The ethics rules are relevant
here for two reasons. First, the corporation’s expert can cite the attorneyethics rules as evidence of the duty of care, provided that the rule was
designed to protect the client in the circumstances in question.37 Second,
the ethics analysis will bear on our analysis of whether the in pari delicto
defense should apply (as discussed in Part IV, subsection A). Of course, an
33. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 50 (2000) (“The provision
of a civil remedy is also important because the lawyer owes special obligations to a client and because
the proper functioning of the legal system depends on competent legal representation.”). “For
purposes of liability . . . a lawyer owes a client the duty to exercise care . . . in pursuing the client’s
lawful objectives in matters covered by representation.” Id.
34. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 165–
66 (5th ed. 1984).
35. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 50 (2000). In fact, some
courts assume a duty once an attorney–client relationship is established. See, e.g., Wachovia Bank,
N.A. v. Ferretti, 935 A.2d 565, 570 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“The elements of a legal malpractice action,
sounding in negligence, include: (1) employment of the attorney or their basis for a duty . . . .”).
36. See RONALD MALLEN, JEFFREY SMITH & ALLISON RHODES, LEGAL MALPRACTICE
§ 37.24 (2014) (“[E]xpert testimony is usually mandatory to prove negligence.”).
37. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52(2)(c) (2000) (providing
that a rule of conduct “may be considered by a trier of fact as an aid in understanding and applying
the standard of” care).
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attorney can be liable for malpractice even in the absence of an ethics
breach, and thus our analysis here will also explore whether the attorney
exercised “the competence and diligence normally exercised by lawyers in
similar circumstances.”38
It is clear that the attorney in each of our examples violated the duty of
care. The attorney in A has violated RPC 1.13 and a host of other ethical
rules. Model Rule 1.13 is undoubtedly designed to protect the client
against precisely the harm that eventuated: attorneys are required to report
to higher authorities to provide the latter with notice and opportunity to
exercise their legal authority to prevent the wrongdoing. Moreover, the
attorney in B has arguably violated RPC 2.1 by failing to inquire further
before engaging in a transaction with reasonable suspicions of client crime
or fraud.
Hypotheticals C and D assume that Roberts failed to act with the care
that attorneys would typically exhibit in this setting. Negligence does not
require knowledge of the client wrongdoing or even willful or reckless
indifference. In C, the attorney can be negligent because of her failure to
consider allegations that would have prompted a reasonable attorney to
look closer. The rumor concerned criminal or fraudulent activity that
would expose the corporation to grave risk. The effort to probe deeper was
modest given these risks: if the allegations were valid, substantial harm was
not only foreseeable; it is overwhelmingly likely if unchecked.39 In D, an
attorney hired to conduct an internal corporate investigation has a duty to
conduct that investigation with reasonable care. Investigations can fail
because attorneys do not satisfy what I have termed the truth standards
that should guide their investigation.40 In hypothetical E, it is likewise
clear that attorney Roberts has breached the duty of care given that she
knew of or should have known of the wrongdoing and took no action.
Causation is typically parsed into two elements—“but for” or factual
cause;41 and “proximate” or legal cause.42 In A, the attorney’s failure to
report is clearly a “but for” cause of the loss. Under the Restatement of
38. Id. § 52(1).
39. See id. § 96 (“[A] lawyer’s duty of care to the organization is not limited to avoidance of
assisting acts that threaten injury to a client. A lawyer is also required to act diligently and to exercise
care by taking steps to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm to a client.”).
40. Kevin H. Michels, Internal Corporate Investigations and the Truth, 40 SETON HALL L. REV.
83, 111–28 (2010).
41. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 (2000) (“Conduct is a factual cause of harm
when the harm would not have occurred absent the conduct.”).
42. See id. § 29 (“An actor’s liability is limited to those harms that result from the risks that
made the actor’s conduct tortious.”).
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Torts test of proximate causation, it would appear that the very risks that
made the conduct a breach of the duty of care, i.e., that failure to advise a
higher-up would allow the executive to further the harm, have eventuated.
Under a closely related foreseeability test, the harm was again best
understood as a proximate cause: it was highly likely that inaction by the
attorney would result in the harm that eventuated. The wrongdoing was
not some surprise that befell the attorney, but the fulfillment of the
executive’s avowed plans. In B and C, crime or fraud that harms the
corporation is the foreseeable result of failure to inquire more deeply before
furthering a transaction when an attorney suspects a client of crime or
fraud, whether willfully blind, reckless or unreasonable. Likewise, in D, it
is hard to imagine a more direct consequence of negligent failure to descry
ongoing wrongdoing then the harms resulting from the undiscovered
wrongdoing.
As implied by the causation analysis above, the corporation will also be
able to satisfy the damages element of a prima facie malpractice claim. In
Part V, subsection C below, we will ask whether comparative negligence
principles should reduce the corporation’s recovery.
Thus, it appears that the plaintiff corporation (in hypotheticals A
through D) has a strong prima facie claim against its own attorney for
malpractice. The analysis, however, is complicated by the fact that the
corporation’s own executive engaged in the wrongdoing. Should that fact
affect the corporation’s right of recovery against its attorney? We turn to
that question next.
III. THE IN PARI DELICTO DEFENSE
A. The Defense and Its Rationale
As its Latin name implies, the in pari delicto defense addresses the
concern that a plaintiff who seeks recovery engaged in wrongdoing of his
own. Although the doctrine can be characterized in a variety of ways, it
generally provides that the plaintiff cannot recover from a defendant if the
plaintiff bears equal or greater fault for the wrongdoing that lead to the
claim.43 Some courts have characterized the wrongdoing that would
invalidate the plaintiff’s claim more narrowly, allowing the in pari delicto

43. See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306 (1985) (“The
defense is grounded on two premises: first, that courts should not lend their good offices to mediating
disputes among wrongdoers; and second, that denying judicial relief to an admitted wrongdoer is an
effective means of deterring illegality.”).

8 MICHELS_FINAL_GERMANO_CLEAN

334

ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS

6/24/2014 11:21 AM

[Vol. 4:318

defense, for example, when the plaintiff’s losses “are substantially caused by
activities the law forbade him to engage in.”44 The doctrine is an
equitable one, and its equitable strains can be heard in centuries-old
formulations: “no court will lend its aid to a man who grounds his action
upon an immoral or illegal act.”45 The defense has been embraced by
both state and federal courts.46 Although the defense was originally an
equitable one, it is now widely accepted as “a defense in actions at law.”47
While courts have spoken generally of wrongdoing, it appears that most
have confined the doctrine’s application to criminal or fraudulent
behavior.48
One challenge posed by the in pari delicto doctrine is whether the
defense should apply when the degree of fault between plaintiff and
defendant differs. Justice Story’s famous description bears quotation here:
And indeed in cases where both parties are in delicto, concurring in an illegal
act, it does not always follow that they stand in pari delicto; for there may be,
and often are, very different degrees in their guilt. One party may act under
circumstances of oppression, imposition, hardship, undue influence, or great
inequality of condition or age; so that his guilt may be far less in degree than
that of his associate in the offen[s]e. And besides, there may be on the part
of the court itself a necessity of supporting the public interests or public
policy in many cases, however reprehensible the acts of the parties may be.49

Thus, courts traditionally assessed the relative culpability of parties,
limiting the defense to those instances in which the plaintiff was an equal
or greater wrongdoer. In addition, the defense could, in certain instances,
be abrogated to serve the public interest.50
In time, however, these limitations have eroded and the defense, in turn,
has expanded. As the United States Supreme Court has noted,
“[n]otwithstanding these traditional limitations, many courts have given
the in pari delicto defense a broad application to bar actions where
44. Am. Trade Partners, LP v. A–1 Int’l Imp. Enters., Ltd., 770 F. Supp. 273, 276 (E.D. Pa.
1991).
45. Fowler v. Scully, 72 Pa. 456, 467 (1872) (quoting sources originating with Holman v.
Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (1775)).
46. See Nisselson v. Lernout, 469 F.3d 143, 151–52 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that “[t]he in pari
delicto defense has long been woven into the fabric of federal law. . . . [Massachusetts has] warmly
embraced [the doctrine]”).
47. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research Found. v.
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 989 A.2d 313, 328 (Pa. 2010).
48. Id.
49. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 423 (W.H. Lyon, Jr. ed., 14th ed 1918) (emphasis added).
50. Id.
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plaintiffs simply have been involved generally in ‘the same sort of
wrongdoing’ as defendants.”51 With respect to federal actions, the
Supreme Court has returned the defense to its original moorings, holding
that the defense will prevail only if “the plaintiff bears at least substantially
equal responsibility for the violations he seeks to redress.”52 The Court
also left room for an exception if enforcement of the securities laws would
be undermined by the defense.53 The latter exception might be framed
generally as a “public-interest” exception, asking whether “preclusion of
the suit would not interfere with the purposes of the underlying law or
otherwise contravene the public interest.”54
The rationale for the doctrine is that courts should “not lend aid to
parties who base their cause of action on their own immoral or illegal
acts.”55 In one memorable formulation, the court declared that it should
not be forced to serve as “referee between thieves.”56 There is also concern
that the wrongdoer will, in a sense, profit from his own wrongdoing if
allowed to recover damages.57 Courts bar the plaintiff’s claim not because
the defendant’s actions were justified in any sense, “but rather because the
plaintiff, being equally wrong, has forfeited any claim to the aid of the
court.”58 Another basis for the defense is deterrence: “denying judicial
relief to an admitted wrongdoer is an effective means of deterring
illegality.”59
B. The Defense and Legal Malpractice
The courts have applied the in pari delicto defense to dismiss claims of
clients against their attorneys in a variety of settings. For example, in
51. Id.; Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 307 (1985) (citing Perma
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138 (1968)); see also Nisselson, 469 F.3d at 152
(“Over time, however, courts expanded the doctrine’s sweep, deploying it as a basis not dismissing
suits whenever a plaintiff had played any role—no matter how modest—in the harm-producing
activity.”).
52. Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 310–11.
53. See id. (stating that the holding of the Court “would not significantly interfere with the
effective enforcement of the securities laws and protection of the investing public”).
54. See Nisselson, 469 F.3d at 152 (characterizing the public-interest exception more generally).
55. Choquette v. Isacoff, 836 N.E.2d 329, 332 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005).
56. Stone v. Freeman, 82 N.E.2d 571, 572 (N.Y. 1948).
57. See Robins v. Lasky, 462 N.E.2d 774, 779 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (describing the court’s
history in refraining from using its judicial power to aid fraudulent practices).
58. Pantely v. Garris, Garris & Garris, PC, 447 N.W.2d 864, 867 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (“In
the familiar economic language of the Chicago School, among wrongdoers equally at fault the law
ought not to redistribute losses caused by the wrong itself, but rather should leave the parties where it
finds them.”).
59. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306 (1985).
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Pantely v. Garris, Garris & Garris, PC,60 the client committed perjury in
testifying about her residency status, allegedly on the advice of counsel.61
The court barred the client from recovery against her attorney under the in
pari delicto defense noting that, despite her emotional stress during her
divorce proceeding, the court “cannot adopt her view that this renders her
conduct less wrong than that of her lawyers. If stress provided an excuse
for perjury, we would do well to abolish the oath and the hypocrisy it
would foster.”62 The court concluded that the parties were therefore in
pari delicto.63 The court also rejected the client’s argument that public
policy warranted an exception to the doctrine, noting that perjury rules
were not the type of complex ethical dilemmas where the client “could
follow an attorney’s advice, do wrong[,] and still maintain suit on the basis
of not being equally at fault.”64
Likewise, the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected a claim against counsel
by a client who suffered damages and possible prosecution for perjuring
himself, again under the alleged advice of counsel.65 In dismissing the
complaint under the in pari delicto defense, the court reasoned that the
public interest did not warrant an exception: “Although the public interest
is served by discouraging attorney misconduct, it would be inappropriate
to promote that interest by removing the damage to those who deliberately
and willfully lie under oath in bankruptcy proceedings.”66 The court
reasoned that an attorney disciplinary action is the appropriate means to
address the attorney’s wrongdoing, not an action that will reward the client
for his own wrongdoing.67 Relying on that reasoning, a Massachusetts
appellate court reached a similar result in dismissing a client’s claim against
an attorney who allegedly advised him to commit perjury regarding his
income and assets in a bankruptcy hearing.68
The client’s wrongdoing that leads to dismissal of his malpractice claim
can take a variety of turns, as an Illinois appellate decision makes clear.69
60. Pantely v. Garris, Garris & Garris, PC, 447 N.W.2d 864 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
61. Id. at 868.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id. (noting that “a law degree does not add to one’s awareness that perjury is immoral”).
65. Evans v. Cameron, 360 N.W.2d 25, 26–27 (Wis. 1985).
66. Id. at 29.
67. Id.
68. See Choquette v. Isacoff, 836 N.E.2d 329, 335 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (“An ‘attorney’s
misconduct of advising clients to perform illegal acts should be discouraged by the threat of attorney
disciplinary action,’ as opposed to clients filing suit against the attorney to recover damages incurred
due to being caught.” (quoting Evans, 360 N.W.2d at 29)).
69. Robins v. Lasky, 462 N.E.2d 774, 775–76 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
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The plaintiff alleged that, on the advice of his attorney, he moved to
Florida to escape service of process in Illinois, at great financial and
emotional cost.70 The plan proved unavailing, the advice negligent, and
the client was served in the action. The court dismissed the client’s claims,
describing the client’s decision as an “admitted attempt to evade the law”
and thus “wrongful conduct.”71
Our next question is how the in pari delicto should fare in the situation
presented here—the failed internal gatekeeper. On the one hand, there is
obvious similarity between the instances cited above and the internalgatekeeping role: both involve attorney wrongdoing and the wrongdoing
of another actor. The executive wrongdoer in our gatekeeping scenario is
not the party seeking redress for the attorney’s malpractice, however.
Should this change the analysis? We turn to this next.
C. The Defense and the Corporate Client
As discussed, in the legal practice setting, the in pari delicto defense asks
whether the client’s wrong should bar her recovery against the attorney.
The attorney in our gatekeeping scenarios represents the corporation, not
the executive who directed and facilitated the wrongful acts.72 Moreover,
in our scenarios, the corporation or its successors, not the executive, seeks
recovery against the attorney in the malpractice action. Thus, a critical
question in the internal-gatekeeping scenario is whether the actions of the
executive should be imputed to the corporation.73 The practical upshot of
such imputation is that the corporation, as the wrongful actor, would be
barred from recovery against the attorney under the in pari delicto defense.
In this section, we will consider the approaches of courts that have
imputed the executive behavior to the corporation and those that deemed
imputation inappropriate. The discussion that follows seeks to sketch
some of the main approaches; it is intended to be more illustrative than
exhaustive.74
70. Id. at 775–79.
71. See id. at 779 (describing the behavior as “unclean hands”).
72. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2013) (noting that the attorney
represents the organization and not its constituents).
73. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research Found.
v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 989 A.2d 313, 333 (Pa. 2010) (“[A]s is often the case, agency law
plays a pivotal role in the defense’s practical availability.”).
74. For example, in order to focus the inquiry, this section will not consider the sole-actor
doctrine, which imputes knowledge of the agent to the company, even when the agent acts adversely
to the corporation when the agent dominates the entity or is the sole person who can act on its
behalf. E.g., In re Amerco Derivative Litig., 252 P.3d 681, 695 (Nev. 2011) (distinguishing between
an agent acting either on his own behalf or on the corporation’s).
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Courts are often called to consider the in pari delicto defense in
connection with corporation claims against auditors. We will consider
these cases in tandem with those against law firms for two reasons. First,
many of the leading decisions on the in pari delicto defense involve auditors
rather than attorneys, as the following discussion will make clear. Second,
courts have readily applied the analysis developed in the auditor setting to
claims against attorneys as well. Although courts have not emphasized the
distinction between the attorney and auditor roles, Part V will draw on the
distinctive obligations of attorneys in assessing the applicability of the
defense corporate claims against counsel.
1. Imputation Absent an “Adverse Interest”
Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman75 is an early and seminal case76
on the question of whether a defendant professional could “use the
wrongdoing of plaintiff’s managers” as a defense against charges of breach
of contract, malpractice, and fraud.77 Employees of Cenco had engaged
in a massive fraud that involved its senior management, including the
chairman and president, along with vice-presidents and other top
managers.78 The fraud, which was not discovered by its independent
auditors, involved the inflation of inventories in Cenco’s Medical/Health
Division far above their actual value.79 This greatly increased the market
price of Cenco’s stock, allowing Cenco to purchase other companies less
expensively, borrow money at lower rates, and receive inflated inventory
values from its insurers for claims for inventory that was lost or
destroyed.80 When the fraud was discovered, purchasers of Cenco’s
inflated stock and the corporation itself brought claims against a variety of
defendants, including the auditors.81
In determining whether the trial judge gave an erroneous instruction to
the jury about whether the auditor could use the wrongdoing of Cenco’s
managers as a defense against the charges of breach of contract,
professional malpractice and fraud, Judge Posner first rejected what it
75. Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1982).
76. See PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 989 A.2d at 331 (characterizing the decision in Cenco as
“pioneering” and describing its influence).
77. Cenco, 686 F.2d at 453.
78. Id. at 451.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. For the purposes of this Article, we are concerned with the corporation’s claim against
the auditors, and the auditors’ invocation of a defense grounded on the wrongdoing of the
corporation’s executives.
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characterized as “one extreme position on this question”—that the
employee’s fraud is always attributed to the corporation by the principle of
respondeat superior.82 With no controlling precedent, the court looked to
the “underlying objectives of tort liability” and determined that the
beneficiaries of a judgment against the auditors would be the stockholders
of Cenco.83 The court characterized this outcome as “perverse” because
the stockholders included the corrupt officers, those who elected the board
of directors who oversaw Cenco during the fraud, and the plaintiff class to
whom the auditors had already paid $3.5 million to as part of the
settlement.84
The court drew a sharp distinction between “fraud on behalf of a
corporation” and “fraud against it.” As the court explained:
Fraud against the corporation usually hurts just the corporation; the
stockholders are the principal if not only victims; their equities vis-à-vis a
careless or reckless auditor are therefore strong. But the stockholders of a
corporation whose officers commit fraud for the benefit of the corporation
are beneficiaries of the fraud. Maybe not net beneficiaries, after the fraud is
unmasked and the corporation is sued—that is a question of damages, and is
not before us. But the primary costs of a fraud on the corporation’s behalf
are borne not by the stockholders but by outsiders to the corporation, and
the stockholders should not be allowed to escape all responsibility for such a
fraud, as they are trying to do in this case.85

If the executives were engaged in fraud against the corporation, then
Cenco would not have imputed their wrongdoing to the corporation, and
the corporation would have a valid claim against the auditors who failed to
discover the fraud.86 The court concluded, however, that the managers
were engaged in fraud against third parties, not the corporation itself, and

82. Id. at 454.
83. Id. at 455.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 456.
86. Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1982). In a later case, the
Seventh Circuit construed the “fraud against the corporation” standard broadly, refusing to impute
knowledge to the corporation and deprive it of a claim against an auditor in a case where the insiders
operated an insurance company while insolvent, although elements of “looting” were also arguably
present. In rejecting the auditor’s argument, the court noted, “More colloquially put, if defendants’
position were accepted, the possession of such ‘friends’ as Reserve had would certainly obviate the
need for enemies.” Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1348 (7th Cir. 1983). The court also offered
a narrow reading of Cenco, suggesting that, even if the fraud were directed at third parties, Cenco
would impute knowledge to the corporation only if the plaintiff corporation would properly
compensate the victims of the wrongdoing, and such recovery would deter future wrongdoing. Id.
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that imputation was not justified.87 The court noted that the board of
directors was comprised of some members who were dishonest and others
who were careless, which made their failure to detect to fraud both “hard
to condone[,]” and that coupled with the scale of the fraud and number of
high ranking managers involved, warranted imposition of responsibility on
the corporation for the fraud that the auditor failed to detect.88 The court
also noted that allowing the corporation to recover against the auditor
would reduce the “incentives to hire honest managers and monitor their
behavior.”89
Although Cenco’s imputation of knowledge from the executives to the
corporation appears to have been influenced at least in part by the unique
circumstance that shareholders who were involved in the fraud might
benefit by allowing a claim against a failed auditor,90 its holding has
persuaded courts to impute knowledge more categorically.91 Relying on
Cenco, the Second Circuit reached a more sweeping result in Kirschner v.
KPMG LLP.92 In that case, a corporation eventually discovered and
disclosed that the President and CEO had, over a period of years, arranged
for hundreds of millions of dollars in loans that camouflaged the
company’s uncollectable debt and created a false picture of the company’s
finances, eventually leading to its bankruptcy.93 The trustee appointed to
advance the corporation’s claims arising prior to bankruptcy filed an action
against the attorneys and auditors for malpractice in failure to discover the
wrongdoing.94 The defendants interposed an in pari delicto defense.95
A central question in the case was whether the wrongdoing of the
87. Schact, 711 F.2d at 1348–49.
88. Cenco, 686 F.2d at 456.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 455–56.
91. See In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 965 A.2d 763, 826 (Del. Ch. 2009) (characterizing Cenco as
“based on the notion that immunizing auditors from malpractice claims, even in situations where the
auditor’s compliance with professional standards might have helped catch the fraud and limit the
harm to the corporation, is good policy because it incentivizes independent directors and even
stockholders to be effective monitors of managerial behavior”). American International is especially
interesting because, in applying New York law, it was constrained to dismiss the malpractice claims of
the corporation against its auditor under the categorical imputation approach of KPMG and its
progeny, which it noted “does not necessarily reflect the outcome that would be reached if Delaware
[law] applied.” Id. at 828; see also Kirschner v. KPMG LLP., 938 N.E.2d 941, 951 (N.Y. 2010)
(noting that the New York court has “held for over a century that all corporate acts—including
fraudulent ones—are subject to the presumption of imputation . . . [a]nd, as with pari delicto, there
are strong considerations of public policy underlying this precedent . . . .”).
92. Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941 (N.Y. 2010).
93. Id. at 945.
94. Id. at 946.
95. Id. at 949.
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executive should be imputed to the corporation.96 If so, the court
reasoned, then the corporation would be in pari delicto with the
professional defendants, and its claim should be barred.97 The court cited
a central principal of agency law, that “the acts of agents, and the
knowledge they acquire while acting within the scope of their authority are
presumptively imputed to their principals.”98 Because corporations can
act only through their agents, it should “be responsible for the acts of its
authorized agents even if particular acts were unauthorized.”99 Agency
law presumes, moreover, “that agents communicate information to their
principals,” regardless of whether such communication in fact takes
place.100 The corporation selects the agent, and therefore should bear the
risk of loss from the dishonest behavior of the agent, even when the agent
commits fraud.101
The KPMG court acknowledged a narrow exception to the general rule
of imputation—the “adverse-interest” exception.102 When the agent
“totally abandons” the corporation’s interests and acts “entirely for his own
or another’s purposes,” then his behavior will not be imputed to the
corporation.103 The court embraced Cenco’s narrow reading of the
exception,104 which applies when the executive steals, embezzles from, or
loots the corporation for his own interests, not when he commits fraud in
his role as an executive.105 The presumption that an agent will
communicate with a principal, the court reasoned, loses its force when the
agent is stealing from his principal.106 Because the executive’s fraud did
not victimize the corporation, the adverse-interest exception did not apply
96. Id. at 947 (describing the adverse-interest exception and its application to corporate
officers).
97. Id. at 949.
98. Id. at 950.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 951.
101. Id.
102. Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 952 (N.Y. 2010).
103. Id.
104. See id. (highlighting the requirement of adversity between the defrauder’s interests and the
interests of the corporation).
105. See id. (“A fraud that by its nature will benefit the corporation is not ‘adverse’ to the
corporation’s interests, even if it was actually motivated by the agent’s desire for personal gain . . . .
Thus, ‘[s]hould the ‘agent act[] both for himself and the principal,’ . . . application of the exception
would be precluded.” (quoting Capital Wireless Corp. v. Deloitte & Touche, 216 A.D.2d 663, 666
(1995))).
106. See id. at 951 (“[T]he presumption that agents communicate information to their
principals . . . governs in every case, except where the corporation is actually the agent’s intended
victim.”).
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here.107 The KPMG court dismissed the claims against the professional
defendants, holding that the acts of the executive were imputed to the
corporation under agency law, and therefore the corporation’s claims were
barred by the in pari delicto defense.108 The holding, the court noted, was
consistent with the centuries-old precedent of imputing the acts of agents
to the principal, and it incentivized corporations to exercise care in the
selection of their agents.109
The sweep of the KPMG decision is indeed striking. With the
exception of an executive’s theft from the corporation, the court’s holding
would effectively insulate attorneys from all liability for failure to report an
executive’s wrongdoing to higher-ups in the organization.
The
organization is irrefutably presumed to “know” of such wrongdoing, and
therefore is deemed responsible for the act regardless of its actual
knowledge. With the exception of hypothetical E, none of the
wrongdoing falls within the adverse-interest exception, since the executives
were not stealing from the corporation or otherwise advancing only their
personal interests.110 In each of these hypotheticals, the attorneys would
be immune from liability for their failings, even if their failings breached
an ethical obligation to investigate or report the information and even if
they were expressly retained to investigate alleged wrongdoing. If attorneys
have an internal-gatekeeping duty, then, under KPMG, it is one without a
civil remedy for its breach.111
For an example of the categorical imputation approach in the law firm
setting, consider In re Greater Southeast Community Hospital Corp. I.112
There, a law firm was alleged to have committed malpractice in connection
with opinion letters it issued that enabled the corporation to obtain

107. Id. at 953.
108. Id. at 959.
109. Id. at 951–52.
110. In theory, the categorical imputation approach would also apply to hypothetical D, where
the attorney was negligent in conducting an internal investigation into whether the executive was
engaged in wrongdoing against a third party, since the executive’s wrongdoing was not adverse to the
corporation. The outcome is so perverse (the imputation would eliminate the law firm’s liability
under the in pari delicto defense) that courts have chosen not to apply the imputation rule in these
circumstances, albeit without explaining why the principles that justify imputation absent an adverse
interest do not warrant imputation here. See Kirschner v. K & L Gates, 46 A.3d 737, 745 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2012) (“By negligently conducting is investigation, K&L Gates affirmatively caused harm
to Le-Nature’s . . . [which] negate[s] the defense of imputation.”).
111. The attorneys would remain accountable in a disciplinary forum for those ethical
breaches, provided that the client (or other party with standing) chose to file an ethical grievance.
112. In re Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp. Corp. I, 353 B.R. 324, 333–34 (Bankr. D.C. 2006).
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additional financing.113 The corporation trustee alleged that the law firm
knew or should have known that the statements in the opinion were false,
and that the corporation relied on those statements in obtaining additional
financing that deepened its insolvency.114 The court dismissed the
malpractice claims against the attorney because the fraud of the executives
was committed on behalf of, rather than against the corporation, and
therefore the adverse-interest exception did not apply.115
In the subsections that follow, we will consider two other categories of
approaches to the in pari delicto defense. In considering these distinctive
approaches, it is important to keep in mind that courts generally agree that
imputation of knowledge of executive wrongdoing to the corporation is
inappropriate when the executive steals from the corporation for the
reasons cited in Cenco and KPMG. The disagreement concerns whether to
impute knowledge of the executive’s wrongdoing in cases in which the
executive furthers a crime or a fraud by the corporation against a third
party in claims by the corporation against those who may have breached
some duty to discover or report the wrongdoing to the corporation.
Despite the fact that the fraud was conducted “on behalf” of the
corporation on a third party,116 the corporation itself can suffer grave
harms that early gatekeeper discovery could have prevented or reduced.
KPMG exemplifies the most sweeping or “categorical” approach to the
imputation question.117 Below we consider two other approaches.
2. An Additional Exception to Imputation: Bad Faith
Our question is when the wrongdoing of a rogue executive will be
imputed to the corporation, thereby providing the failed gatekeeper an in
pari delicto defense against the corporation’s claim for malpractice. Here
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 369 (emphasizing that although the company was “harmed by the artificial
prolongation of its existence,” it “benefit[ed] to some degree by that same prolongation at the expense
of innocent third parties”). Of course, even courts that purport to impute knowledge absent an
adverse interest, struggle to define the exception. In BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A. v. Clifford,
the law firm allegedly advised senior officials of a bank to engage in an unlawful transaction. BCCI
Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A. v. Clifford, 964 F. Supp. 468, 472–73 (D.D.C. 1997). Although
defendants offered arguments to suggest that the officials were acting on behalf of rather than against
the corporation, the court found the allegations sufficient to deny the law firm’s motion to dismiss.
Id. at 479–80.
116. Thus, the question is whether to impute knowledge of executive wrongdoing to others
when the executives are, in Judge Posner’s memorable phrase, “turning the company into an engine
of theft against outsiders.” Cenco, 686 F.2d at 454.
117. Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 941.
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we consider an additional exception to imputation where the gatekeeper
was alleged to be in collusion with the executive.
In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health
Education & Research Foundation v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP,118 the
auditor was alleged to have colluded with the officers of the corporation to
misstate the financial condition of the entity, “concealing the corporation’s
deepening insolvency and facilitating management’s continuation of a
ruinous business strategy while thwarting essential, remedial intervention
by the board of trustees.”119 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
acknowledged that, in some instances, the in pari delicto defense could be
validly interposed by an auditor in a claim by the corporation for
malpractice.120 The court stated that, as a general matter, the executive’s
wrongdoing should be imputed to the corporation, and the in pari delicto
defense should therefore apply, when the auditor is negligent.121 The
court reasoned that imputation in this instance “gives appropriate
recognition to the fact that it is the principal who has empowered the
agent.”122 The court also noted that the “outrageous” behavior of the
executives “should have a legitimate place in the negligence case” against
the auditor.123
The court concluded, however, that imputation would not be
appropriate when the auditor and the corporation collude.124 The
corporation should not be charged with knowledge of its executives’
wrongdoing against a third party that “actively and intentionally”
prevented those in the corporation’s “governing structure who were nonparticipants in the fraud from acquiring such knowledge.”125 The court
also noted that the assumption that agents will share information with the
principal does not apply when the executive and third party work actively
to conceal information from the principal.126 Thus, when the auditor
engages in secretive, collusive behavior with the executive, it will not
receive the benefit of the in pari delicto defense.127
118. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research Found. v.
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 989 A.2d 313 (Pa. 2010).
119. Id. at 315.
120. Id. at 331.
121. Id. at 335.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 336.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 337.
127. See BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A. v. Clifford, 964 F. Supp. 468, 480 (D.D.C.
1997) (refusing to apply the imputation doctrine to shield defendants from liability where plaintiffs
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In BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A. v. Clifford,128 the court relied on
a bad-faith analysis in refusing to impute knowledge of executive’s criminal
wrongdoing to the corporation when the law firm was alleged to be
complicit in the wrongdoing.129 The court reasoned that imputation
“may not be invoked where third persons use the agent to further their
own frauds upon the principal”130 because imputation would in that
instance “shield” the law firm from the consequences of its own fraud.131
In Kirschner v. K & L Gates,132 the district court considered a
complaint against a law firm that was retained by a special committee of
the board of directors to investigate allegations by three senior managers
who resigned.133 The managers alleged that the CEO had and continued
to engage in fraud in connection with the company’s financial
statements.134 The law firm found no evidence of malfeasance by the
CEO, a report relied on by the special committee.135 The complaint
alleged that the law firm “failed to uncover the massive fraud being
perpetrated by [the CEO,]” and that the CEO and others were able to
continue to “loot” the corporation, “incurring further corporate debt and
wasting corporate funds on avoidable transactions.”136 Among other
failings, the law firm allegedly allowed the CEO, the alleged wrongdoer, to
“dictate and limit the manner in which the investigation was
conducted.”137 After more expenditure by the CEO, the company
eventually sought relief in bankruptcy court, and the trustee sought relief
on behalf of the corporation contending, inter alia, claims of malpractice,
breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent misrepresentation against the
firm.138
The court acknowledged that Alleghany would require imputation of the
executive’s wrongdoing to the corporation in cases of negligence.139 It
alleged that corporate officials’ and attorneys’ collusion lead to the corporation’s demise).
128. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A. v. Clifford, 964 F. Supp. 468 (D.D.C. 1997).
129. Id. at 479–80.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Kirschner v. K & L Gates LLP, 46 A.3d 737 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
133. Id. at 742.
134. Id. at 741.
135. Id. at 744–45.
136. Id. at 745.
137. Id. at 756; see also Kevin H. Michels, Internal Corporate Investigations and the Truth, 40
SETON HALL L. REV. 83, 103–04 (2010) (discussing the duties of investigative counsel to develop an
accurate account, and the means by which such account should be pursued by investigative counsel).
138. Kirschner, 46 A.3d at 746–47.
139. Id. at 764.
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concluded, however, that the allegations satisfied the two instances in
which Alleghany nonetheless allows liability—bad faith and executive acts
that were not designed to benefit the corporation.140 With respect to the
former, the court offers scant analysis of why the law firm’s failings amount
to bad faith rather than negligence, other than to cite plaintiff’s averments
to that effect.141 With respect to the second, the court offers little
explanation of why and when the alleged wrongdoing of the executive
would satisfy the seemingly narrow exception for adverse-interest offered
by Cenco and KPMG and seemingly embraced by Alleghany.142 The court
stated simply that, “we cannot conclude that a material misstatement of
corporate financial information, so as to hide [the CEO’s] looting of the
company, provided any benefit to [the corporation].”143
Given
Alleghany’s statement that benefit to the corporation would, as in Cenco,
be construed “liberally,” the K & L Gates decision seems to strain
application of the rule. Perhaps K & L Gates reflects the court’s discomfort
with the straightjacket of an imputation rule that would immunize
negligent gatekeepers whose failings prevent boards from performing their
oversight role. As we will discuss in Part V, the K & L Gates court might
have considered the significance of the fact that the law firm was expressly
retained to investigate the wrongdoing in question.
The Restatement Third of Agency has spawned some controversy over
its handling of the imputation question as applied to gatekeepers. Section
5.03 restates the longstanding principle that notice of the agent’s acts are
imputed to the principal, and Section 5.04 restates the adverse-interest
exception, requiring—again, as long understood—that the agent act
“solely” for his (or another’s) benefit in order to trigger the exception.
Section 5.04 adds a new exception “to protect the rights of a third party
who dealt with the principal in good faith.”144 The Section provides
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See Kirschner v. K & L Gates LLP, 46 A.3d 737, 764 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (relying on
Allegheny without directly addressing the narrow exception for adverse interest).
143. Id.
144. Section 5.04 of the Restatement Third Agency provides:
For purposes of determining a principal's legal relations with a third party, notice of a fact that
an agent knows or has reason to know is not imputed to the principal if the agent acts adversely
to the principal in a transaction or matter, intending to act solely for the agent’s own purposes
or those of another person. Nevertheless, notice is imputed (a) when necessary to protect the
rights of a third party who dealt with the principal in good faith; or (b) when the principal has
ratified or knowingly retained a benefit from the agent’s action. A third party who deals with a
principal through an agent, knowing or having reason to know that the agent acts adversely to
the principal, does not deal in good faith for this purpose.
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further that a third party “knowing or having reason to know that the
agent acts adversely to the principal, does not deal in good faith.”145 As
Mark Loewenstein observes, the provision’s context suggests that we read
the good faith exception as “an exception to an exception,” meaning that
the presence or absence of good faith by a third party matters only when
the agent is acting solely to benefit himself (or another).146 The adverseinterest exception is rarely satisfied because corporate wrongdoers seldom
act “solely” for their own interests. As a result, this interpretation would
rarely change the analysis in gatekeeper failure cases.147
Were it only that simple. The Restatement Third offers a curious
interpretation of Section 5.04 in Illustration 5. In the Illustration, A, an
agent of the corporation (CFO), withholds material information from
auditor T who certifies incorrect financial statements even though he
“knows or has reason to know” that the information was withheld. In a
claim by the corporation against T for losses resulting from the faulty
financial statements, knowledge of A’s fraud will not be imputed to the
corporation because T did not act in good faith. The Illustration is
confusing because nowhere does it state that A was acting “solely in his
interest” in withholding information from T, thus calling into question the
limited reading of the good faith exception offered in the paragraph above.
Does Illustration 5 propose a new exception to imputation, applicable
generally and not only when the agent has an adverse interest? If so, why
would such a profoundly new doctrine be offered as an illustration rather
than in the statement of the rule set forth in Section 5.04, which by its
terms addresses only the adverse interest exception? Loewenstein considers
these and other anomalies posed by Illustration 5, concluding that the
drafters of the Third Restatement intended to create a new exception to
imputation and used the good faith exception and Illustration 5 to do so
after failed attempts to broaden the adverse-interest exception.148 After a
careful study of the ALI’s deliberations and the language proposed and
adopted, Loewenstein characterized the change as “a stealth attempt to
significantly alter the imputation doctrine as it existed for many, many

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 (2006).
145. Id.
146. Mark J. Loewenstein, Imputation, The Adverse Interest Exception, and the Curious Case of
the Restatement (Third) of Agency, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 305, 341–42 (2013).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 340–47. Professor Loewenstein traces the American Law Institute discussions that
lead to adoption of this change, citing concerns about the interests, albeit disclosed, of those who
encouraged the change. Id. at 330–40.
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years with no acknowledgment that such an alteration was taking place or
why.”149
If Section 5.04 and Illustration 5 intended to create a new imputation
exception, then the next question is how to interpret its “know or reason to
know” standard.
Does this suggest that imputation would be
inappropriate when a gatekeeper is negligent, or is something akin to
recklessness on the part of the gatekeeper required to trigger exception?
The Restatement comments offer no elaboration.150
3. No Imputation for Negligence
Other courts, evaluating the culpability of professionals alleged to have
failed in their gatekeeping role, have rejected the traditional imputation
analysis in determining whether the executive’s culpability should be
ascribed to the corporate client for purposes of the in pari delicto defense.
In NCP Litigation Trust v. KPMG LLP,151 two executives intentionally
provided false information to the company’s auditors, who did not
discover the misstatements for “several years.”152 When subsequent audits
uncovered the fraud and tens of millions of dollars in losses, the
corporation reported the misstatements and declared bankruptcy.153 A
trustee, appointed to pursue the interests of the corporation—as its
successor interest—and shareholders, brought a negligence claim against
the auditors, which raised the in pari delicto defense.154 The trial court
applied a standard agency analysis, imputing the wrongdoing of the
executives to the corporation, and holding therefore that the corporation
and the auditors were in pari delicto, dismissing the case against the
auditors.155
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that knowledge of the wrongdoing
of the executives should not be imputed to the corporation for purposes of
the in pari delicto defense.156 The court began by acknowledging that,
under agency law, the knowledge of the agent—in this case, the
executives—is imputed to the principals—here, the corporation.157 The
149. Id. at 346.
150. See id. at 344–45 (noting the absence of any explanation in the Restatement comments on
the elements of the “good faith” standard).
151. NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871 (N.J. 2006).
152. Id. at 873.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 879.
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court discussed three rationales for the imputation rule.158 First, as
discussed earlier, the rule creates incentives for principals to select agents
carefully.159 Second, the rule “encourages a principal to develop effective
procedures for the transmission of material facts, while discouraging
practices that isolate the principal or co-agents from facts known to an
agent.”160 Third, the rule encourages third parties to do business with
agents, because the principal remains ultimately accountable to the third
party for the agent’s acts and representations.161 At the heart of the
doctrine is a compelling rationale: principals should not benefit “through
their agents while avoiding the consequences of agent misdeeds.”162
The court found those rationales less compelling in considering the
liability of an auditor who negligently fails to discover the agent’s fraud.163
The imputation rule, it noted, “operates on an all-or-nothing basis,” either
allowing or eliminating liability and is insensitive to the demands of
particular cases.164 Imputation, the court noted, understandably protects
innocent third parties who are defrauded by the actions of the
corporation’s executive, by allowing the third party to recover from the
corporation.165 Here, by contrast, imputation would insulate an auditor
alleged to have failed to detect the executives’ fraud in breach of its
contract with, and duty of care to, the corporation.166 The court also
noted that by rejecting immunity and thereby allowing claims against
auditors, it was maintaining incentives for the auditors to perform
158. Id.
159. See id. (“[T]he imputation doctrine ‘creates incentives for a principal to choose agents
carefully and to use care in delegating functions to them.’” (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (2006))).
160. Id. at 871 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, § 5.03 cmt. b (2006)).
161. NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871, 879 (N.J. 2006) (“[T]hird parties who
are aware that the principal is ultimately accountable for its agent’s actions and representations are
more likely to conduct business through an agent.”).
162. Id. at 879 (quoting Andrew J. Morris, Clarifying the Imputation Doctrine: Charging Audit
Clients with Responsibility for Unauthorized Audit Interference, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 339, 350
(2001)).
163. See NCP, 901 A.2d at 879 (reaching the same conclusion as the Appellate Division, but
refusing to adopt the same equitable fraud rationale).
164. See id. at 880 (stating that “[imputation] is unforgivably binary” (quoting Andrew J.
Morris, Clarifying the Imputation Doctrine: Charging Audit Clients with Responsibility for Unauthorized
Audit Interference, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 339, 353 (2001))).
165. See id. at 882 (responding to the dissent’s statement that, as a result of the holding, the
imputation defense will cease to exist).
165. See id. at 879–80 (reasoning that the imputation defense “in a simple principal–agent
relationship begins to break down” when applied to a more complex fact scenario involving a
corporate audit).
166. Id.
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properly.167 Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision appears to
eliminate the in pari delicto defense for the negligent auditor.168
Some courts have refused to impute the executives’ wrongdoing to the
corporation in negligence for other reasons. One approach is the
“innocent insiders” theory, which does not impute the wrongdoing of the
executives to the corporation if there was at least one member of corporate
management without knowledge of the fraud who could have prevented
it.169 The innocent-insider approach would eliminate imputation in the
vast majority of claims against failed gatekeepers. Of course, knowledge of
the wrongdoing, if sufficiently widespread among management can
eliminate the need for imputation, since the actual knowledge of the
corporation would preclude a claim against the failed gatekeeper under an
in pari delicto defense.
For example, in an Ohio case, the trustee for the corporation alleged
malpractice against a law firm for a variety of alleged failings in a
transaction between the corporate client and an Employee Stock
Ownership Program (ESOP) to purchase one hundred percent of the
corporation’s outstanding stock.170 The law firm allegedly failed to advise
the board that the transaction involved self-dealing, and instead facilitated
the conflicted transaction.171 The court held that, “[c]orporate counsel
has a duty to act as gatekeeper, to take appropriate action to advise the
directors, and to help them avoid wrongdoing that could seriously harm its
167. See id. at 883 (noting that a holding making auditors liable for their negligence would
encourage them to be more sincere and conscientious in the future). The court later elaborated on
this argument in its analysis of the shareholder claims against the corporation, claims that present
different concerns although none that are central to the analysis here. Id. at 886–87.
168. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research
Found. v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 989 A.2d 313, 335 (Pa. 2010) (“[W]e read the rationale
for the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in NCP as effectively negating imputation (and thus
barring the in pari delicto defense) . . . .”).
169. See Smith ex rel. Estate of Boston Chicken, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 175 F. Supp.
2d 1180, 1199 (D. Ariz. 2001) (noting that the wrongful act of a corporate actor would not be
imputed to a corporation if it could allege the existence of one corporate actor who would have
prevented the fraud if he had been aware of it (citing Wechsler v. Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent &
Sheinfeld, 212 B.R. 34, 44–45 (S.D.N.Y. 1997))); Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. BDO Seidman, 49 F.
Supp. 2d 644, 650–51 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (discussing two cases where the courts refused to impute the
wrongful conduct on the corporation unless all of the managers were involved in the defrauding); see
also Jonathan Witmer-Rich & Mark Herrmann, Corporate Complicity Claims: Why There Is No
Innocent Decision-Maker Exception to Imputing an Officer’s Wrongdoing to a Bankrupt Corporation, 74
TENN. L. REV. 47, 50 (2006) (arguing that the exception is inconsistent with agency law, bad policy
and not likely to be widely adopted by courts).
170. Antioch Litig. Trust v. McDermott Will & Emery LLP, 738 F. Supp. 2d 758, 770–71
(S.D. Ohio 2010).
171. Id. at 771.
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corporate client.”172 The court rejected the law firm’s in pari delicto
defense partly on the grounds that it was not clear from the pleadings that
the self-interested directors dominated the board, therefore warranting
imputation of their action to the entity.173 The court also noted that the
pleadings did not allege that the corporation had equal or greater
culpability than the law firm.174
IV. IMPUTATION AND GATEKEEPING: COMPETING RATIONALES
A. Introduction
The question, let us recall, is when should law firms that fail in the
internal-gatekeeper role be allowed to interpose an in pari delicto defense to
a corporate client claim for malpractice. For many courts, the question
quickly devolves into an analysis of whether to “impute” the wrongdoing
or its knowledge to the corporation under agency principles. If the
corporation is deemed the wrongdoer or is deemed to be aware of the
wrongdoing—i.e., if the wrongdoing is imputed to the corporation—then
the corporation is equal or more culpable than the lawyer and therefore the
lawyer should have the benefit of the in pari delicto defense. It is difficult
to imagine more varied and inconsonant judicial approaches to the
problem than those we have considered—imputation in the absence of an
adverse interest, bad-faith imputation, and the rejection of imputation in
cases of negligence. In this Part, the goal is not to assess the relative merits
of these approaches, but to take a closer look at the reasons for imputing
executive wrongdoing and its knowledge to the corporation, as well as the
tensions posed by these goals and the gatekeeping role of the attorney.
This will set the stage for my attempt to reconcile these divergent goals
into a new imputation exception in Part V.
At first blush, agency law certainly seems relevant to an in pari delicto
defense: it explores the bases for attributing “the legal consequences of one
person’s [action] to . . . another person.”175 Because the in pari delicto
defense asks us to compare culpability between the corporation and the
failed gatekeeper, it is tempting to look to the attribution principles of
agency law to determine whether the corporation should be attributed
blame. We will begin by examining agency’s law attribution of liability

172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Id. at 772–73.
Id. at 773.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY intro note (2006).
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from agent to principal, asking whether it bears on the imputation
question posed by the in pari delicto defense in our examples. Next, we
will examine agency law’s imputation of knowledge from agent to principal,
again exploring its relevance for our question.
B. Imputation of Liability
The Restatement Third of Agency distinguishes between the “direct”
and “vicarious” liability of a principal for the actions of an agent.176
Direct liability can be imposed on the principal who grants “actual
authority” to an agent to engage in the wrongful behavior.177 The
imputation questions posed by our scenarios do not implicate actual
authority because the board of directors had no knowledge of the
executive’s plans, and therefore did not manifest to the agent that it desired
the agent to undertake the wrongful acts.178 Vicarious liability, however,
turns not on the principal’s authorization of the wrongdoing but on the
nature of the agent’s role.179 Thus, a principal is vicariously liable for the
torts of its agents who act on apparent authority180 and for the torts of
employees acting within the scope of their employment.181 In our
scenarios, if a third party, such as the patient in Scenario A, who ingested
the medication and suffered a stroke, brought a claim against the
corporation, clearly the wrongdoing of the executives would and should be
attributed to the company under one or both of these vicarious liability
principles.
One quite literal objection is that in pari delicto is not concerned with
whether the principal is liable for the agent’s act, but whether the principal
should be deemed the criminal or intentional wrongdoer for purposes of

176. See id. § 7.07 cmt. b (2006) (stating that respondeat superior subjects the employer to
vicarious liability, which is distinct from direct liability).
177. See id. (recognizing that an employer can be subject to direct liability for the “harm caused
by the employee’s tortious conduct”).
178. See id. § 2.01 (“An agent acts with actual authority when, at the time of taking action that
has legal consequences for the principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the
principal’s manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to act.”).
179. See id. § 7.08 cmt. b (holding the principal accountable when the third party reasonably
believes that the agent is acting on behalf of the principal and such belief is traceable to the principal’s
manifestations).
180. See id. § 7.08 (“A principal is subject to vicarious liability for a tort committed by an
agent in dealing or communicating with a third party on or purportedly on behalf of the principal
when actions taken by the agent with apparent authority constitute the tort or enable the agent to
conceal its commission.”).
181. See id. § 7.07 (imposing vicarious liability on an employer for an employee’s torts
committed “within the scope of employment”).
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the in pari delicto defense.182 We will explore this form of imputation,
nonetheless, because KPMG imputes the “act” to the principal on grounds
similar to those that warrant imputation of liability.183 If the executive’s
wrongful “act” should be imputed to the corporation for roughly the same
reasons as liability for the act, then the analysis bears directly on the in pari
delicto defense because the corporation would, in such instance, be more
culpable than the law firm.
The question, however, is whether the justifications for vicarious
liability hold any force in the in pari delicto scenarios at issue here despite
the KPMG court’s allusion to this theory in support of imputation. First,
both forms of vicarious liability presume that the agent has committed a
tort against the third party. While the executive in our scenario no doubt
harmed those who consumed the medication, the attorney in our
hypotheticals is a victim and is not seeking to impose liability on the
corporation for the wrong committed against him by the agent. In fact,
the claim here runs the other way, from principal to attorney. Thus, it
may simply be a category error to suggest that the vicarious liability
theories of agency law should inform our analysis of the in pari delicto
defense.
Vicarious liability under the apparent-authority doctrine derives from
the behavior of the principal in creating the manifestation of apparent
authority: if the principal creates a reasonable belief in a third party that
the agent is authorized to act on behalf of the principal, then the principal
should be liable for the agent’s actions.184 Liability is extended to the
principal regardless of the agent’s motivations or whether the agent’s acts
are “beneficial” to the principal—in large part because the principal is
responsible for creating a reasonable belief in the third party that the agent
is acting with the principal’s authorization.185 The rationale sheds no
light on the in pari delicto question posed by our scenario: unlike the armslength third party, the lawyer has not relied on or taken action because of
the agent’s apparent authority.186
182. See Antioch Litig. Trust v. McDermott Will & Emery LLP, 738 F. Supp. 2d 758, 772–73
(S.D. Ohio 2010) (explaining the applicability of the in pari delicto doctrine).
183. See Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 950 (N.Y. 2010) (“A corporation must,
therefore, be responsible for the acts of its authorized agents even if particular acts were
unauthorized.”).
184. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.08 cmt. b (2006) (basing liability on a
principal’s manifestations towards a third party).
185. See id. (reasoning that a principal’s control over a third party’s perception justifies the
imposition of liability).
186. See id. § 2.03 cmt. d (“Some transactions by their nature should strike a dissonant chord
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Respondeat superior is premised in part on the notion that the
“employer’s ability to exercise control over its employees’ work-related
conduct enables the employer to take measures to reduce the incidence of
tortious conduct.”187 Thus, one goal is to create employer incentives for
supervision beyond those already provided by the direct action against an
employer. The rationale has force in our in pari delicto scenarios, provided
that we are mindful of the countervailing concern: one important method
of control that the employer exercises over the executive is the corporate
attorney who fulfills her gatekeeping role by discovering and reporting
executive wrongdoing. Another justification for respondeat superior is the
simple fairness of holding an employer accountable for the harm caused to
third parties by an employee, whose actions—by definition—the employer
could control.188 This relates closely to the equitable notion that other
authorities have cited in support of the respondeat superior rule: if the
employer can benefit through the actions of its employees, it ought also be
responsible for their wrongful actions.189 The rationale does strike a
strong normative chord: those who empower others to act on their behalf
should bear the benefits and burdens of that choice. While this rationale
appears most compelling when an executive harms a third party in the
corporation’s name, it retains at least some force in the in pari delicto
setting as well.
C. Imputation of Knowledge Under Agency Law
Agency law is not concerned only with the imposition of liability on the
principal. It also imputes the agent’s knowledge to the principal on matters
material to the agent’s role.190 The imputation of knowledge would
for a reasonable third party, given the situation in which an agent has been placed, the nature of the
principal or its activities, or what the third party knows of the agent’s position within an
organization. A basic circumstance is whether the transaction is itself legal.”).
187. Id. § 7.07 cmt. b (2006).
188. See id. (differentiating acts that are subject to the principal’s control from those that are
not).
189. One traditional rationale for these attributions of liability is that the corporation can act
only through its agents, and therefore the corporation should be deemed responsible for these actions
even if they are not authorized. See, e.g., Lee v. Pittsburgh Coal & Min. Co., 56 How. Prac. 373,
375 (Super. Ct.1877), aff’d 75 N.Y. 601 (1878) (holding a company liable for a contract and sale
made through its “agents of natural persons . . . deemed to be clothed with all the powers and
authority necessary or proper to effectuate the purposes of their creation”).
190. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 (2006) (“For purposes of determining a
principal’s legal relations with a third party, notice of a fact that an agent knows or has reason to
know is imputed to the principal if knowledge of the fact is material to the agent’s duties to the
principal, unless the agent (a) acts adversely to the principal as stated in § 5.04, or (b) is subject to a
duty to another not to disclose the fact to the principal.”).
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appear to be more closely akin to the issues implicated by the in pari delicto
defense: if the corporation should be ascribed knowledge of the executive’s
wrongdoing in our scenarios, then clearly the attorney is less culpable than
the corporation, whose executive engaged in fraudulent or criminal
behavior. As discussed earlier, courts that have imputed knowledge from
the executive to corporation for purposes of the in pari delicto defense have
relied, at least in part, on the knowledge-imputation principle.
A critical threshold question is whether the imputation standard under
agency law applies to the in pari delicto scenarios addressed in the
hypotheticals. The Restatement imputes knowledge from agent to
principal “[f]or purposes of determining a principal’s legal relations with a
third party” except when the agent “acts adversely to the principal.”191
This would appear to justify imputation in all of the hypotheticals in Part I
other than when the executive steals from the corporation,192 as some
courts have found.193 We must proceed with caution, however. The
lawyer is not the archetypical “third party” contemplated by the
imputation doctrine—for example, the consumer of the medicine
described in our example. Unlike the traditional third party, the lawyer
has not been harmed by the corporation or its agent. The distinction
between the “third party” contemplated by the Restatement and the lawyer
becomes more pronounced when we examine one important rationale for
the knowledge imputation rule in the in pari delicto setting. We impute
knowledge from the agent to the principal in part because the agent has a
duty to keep the principal informed.194 The lawyer in our examples is not
only a “third party,” she is an additional agent of the corporation with
reporting duties of her own.195
Another rationale for knowledge imputation stems from the simple
191. Id.
192. See Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1982) (considering
circumstances where the executives engaged in fraud against the corporation).
193. See the previous discussion of imputation absent an adverse interest in Part III subsection
C.1.
194. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (2006) (noting that one reason to
impute knowledge to principal is that “[a]n agent . . . has a duty, unless otherwise agreed, to use
reasonable effort to transmit material facts to the principal or to coagents designated by the
principal”).
195. See id. § 1.01 cmt. c. (stating that a lawyer-client relationship is an agency relationship).
The attorney, just like the corporation’s other agents, must “act on the principal’s behalf and subject
to the principal’s control,” according to the Restatement’s definition of agency. See id. § 1.01
(defining agency relationship as “the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’)
manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and
subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.”).
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justice of holding a principal responsible for the information on which its
agent acts. At the Restatement reasons:
A principal’s agents link the principal to the external world for purposes of
taking action, including the acquisition of facts material to their work for the
principal. An agent undertakes to act on behalf of a principal; at the time
the agent determines how to act, facts known to the agent at the time should
guide the agent’s determination of what action to take, if any.196

This rationale parallels the rationale for imputing liability to the
principal discussed earlier.197 The justification hints at a strong normative
intuition: the principal who seeks to benefit from the agent’s information
gathering (and actions based on that information) cannot insulate himself
from the burden of that knowledge.198 For convenience, I will call this
the “benefit–burden” rationale of imputation. To the extent we visualize
the lawyer as a “third party” to the corporation-executive relationship, the
benefit-burden rationale does appear to justify imputation of executive
wrongdoing to the corporation in its claims against counsel.
Courts have also favored imputation of knowledge in gatekeeper settings
in order to encourage principals to select and monitor agents
effectively.199 The premise is uncontroversial: as the Restatement reasons,
imputation incentivizes principals to choose effective agent-monitoring
techniques, and discourages principals from adopting policies that will
“isolate the principal[s] . . . from facts known [by] agents.”200 Although
the rationale holds force generally, we cannot ignore the irony of allowing
this rationale to justify the wholesale rejection of a corporation’s claims
against their failed lawyer gatekeeper. The law firm is not only an agent, as
described above, but also one who in certain instances is ethically and
statutorily obligated to report information to the principal about the
behavior of the principal’s executives. If the corporation’s gatekeeper
agents are categorically immunized from liability for failure to provide
information to the corporation, one wonders how effectively the
corporation could monitor its affairs through its agents—a concern that
goes well beyond incentive.
Consider, by way of simple analogy, an executive who does not advise
196. Id. § 5.03 cmt. b.
197. See supra Part IV. subsection B. n.190–91.
198. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (2006) (noting, with respect to
transaction example, that imputation precludes principal from using agent as a “shield”).
199. See Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 951–52 (N.Y. 2010) (emphasizing that
“imputation fosters an incentive for a principal to select honest agents and delegate duties with care”).
200. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (2006).
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the board of critical information about the operations of the company. In
a claim against the executive for wrongdoing, the executive, although an
agent, could not interpose a defense based on imputation of knowledge
from agent to principal. If knowledge imputation protected the agent
from liability to the principal for nondisclosure, the agent’s underlying
duty to disclose information would be eviscerated. Corporations hire law
firms, also agents, with the expectation that the latter will fulfill their
ethical and statutory duties to report the wrongdoing of their employees,
often an important part of the corporation’s monitoring mechanism.
The Restatement acknowledges that in certain instances, imputation
should not defeat gatekeeper reporting duties:
A principal may retain a service provider on terms or for tasks that make
imputation of agents’ knowledge irrelevant to subsequent claims that the
principal may assert against the service provider. For example, a principal
may retain a service provider to assess the accuracy of its financial reporting
or the adequacy of its internal financial controls or other internal processes,
such as its processes for reporting and investigating complaints of harassment
in the workplace. If the service provider fails to detect or report deficiencies,
the principal’s claim against the service provider should not be defeated by
imputing to the principal its agents’ knowledge of deficiencies in the
processes under scrutiny.201

The Restatement’s example is helpful, although it stops shy of identifying
the reason why imputation would not apply here, other than to deem it
“irrelevant.”202
The Restatement correctly refuses to impute knowledge when a service
provider fails to detect or report wrongdoing not because imputation is
“irrelevant,” but presumably for a more basic, unstated reason. In a claim
between the corporation and the failed service provider, imputation may
be inconsistent with the very reason for which the service provider was
retained: to descry and report the information in question.203 In a critical
201. Id.
202. Perhaps a better term would be “inappropriate,” since a principal’s imputed knowledge
would be quite “relevant” in a subsequent claim against one hired to identify and report such
knowledge, although we should nonetheless resist such imputation.
203. Auditors are routinely hired for the purpose of detecting fraud, and Cenco’s imputation of
knowledge to the corporation when its auditors fail in their express calling is thus especially troubling.
See In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 965 A.2d 763, 829 n.246 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“[I]f auditors are
employed, as I think is true, in material part because there is the potential that corporate officials may
misuse their powers and commit acts of financial wrongdoing, immunizing auditors in situations
when, but for the auditor’s professional negligence, wrongful managerial behavior may have been
stopped before it resulted in grievous harm relieves the audit firm of any responsibility in one of the
circumstances when the auditor’s compliance with its professional standard of care is most critical.”).
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sense, the service provider may have been hired, in part, because the
corporation will be imputed knowledge of its agent’s wrongdoing in claims
by third parties. The service provider’s monitoring role is an important
means of preventing such wrongdoing and the corporation’s attendant
liability to third parties associated with such claims. Even if the attorney
was not hired expressly to engage in monitoring efforts, an attorney’s
compliance with the internal-gatekeeping requirements of the ethics rules
and statutory duties can be an important part of the corporation’s
monitoring efforts. Thus, imputation of facts that the attorney was
obligated to report may well be inappropriate in circumstances in which he
was expressly or impliedly retained for the purpose of finding and
reporting such information.204
Some important distinctions are beginning to emerge from the
confusion that has enshrouded the in pari delicto defense in the attorneygatekeeper setting. While it is generally sensible to impute knowledge
from an executive to the corporation when the corporation is sued by a
third party for wrongdoing furthered by the executive in the corporation’s
name, the rationales that support such general imputation are less
compelling in claims between the corporation and an attorney who failed
in the internal-gatekeeping role. As discussed, the attorney is not the
archetypical “third party” harmed by the corporation through its
executive’s wrongdoing, but an additional agent of the corporation, in
many circumstances charged with helping to prevent the very wrong in
question.
V. A PROPOSED NEW APPROACH: THE GATEKEEPER-IMPUTATION
EXCEPTION
A. The Gatekeeper-Imputation Exception
As Part IV demonstrates, agency law’s imputation principles offer
confusing and at times inconsistent guidance for determining when
204. There is an important instance in which imputation of knowledge would be appropriate
to ground an in pari delicto defense. As the Restatement notes, “If a principal’s agents fail to disclose
or misstate material information to a third party who provides services to the principal, the agents’
conduct may result in flawed work by the service provider.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
§ 5.03 cmt. b (2006). Of course, the service provider may or may not be justified in relying on the
information provided by the agent, especially when circumstances suggest that the agent’s statements
are less than trustworthy. If reliance is justified, and the information proves incorrect, it seems fair to
impute knowledge of the misstatement to the corporation. This imputed knowledge, in turn, may
ground the attorney’s in pari delicto defense. On the other hand, if the reliance is justified, the
attorney presumably has not committed malpractice in the first place.
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lawyers who have failed in the internal-gatekeeping role should be entitled
to interpose an in pari delicto defense. In this Part, we will search for a
standard that more closely captures the core concerns implicated by the
defense in the failed attorney gatekeeper setting. Two caveats before we
begin: First, while the approach offered below may offer insight on the
imputation question regardless of the type of gatekeeper, the inquiry that
follows is directed at the unique concerns implicated by the attorney’s
gatekeeper role.205 As I will discuss, the standard proposed here derives at
least in part from the unique role of the attorney, and the reader should
therefore not assume complete correspondence with non-attorney
gatekeeping or monitoring roles. Second, the proposal that follows is
designed to address the challenges posed by claims for attorney failings in
the internal-gatekeeping role, and not all corporation malpractice claims
against counsel in which the in pari delicto defense might apply.
A threshold question that must be addressed by any proposal for reform
is whether agency law and its imputation principles should bear at all on
the in pari delicto defense in the corporate setting. It is tempting to dismiss
imputation as inapposite here, on the grounds that imputation is designed
to hold the corporation responsible for the harms its agents inflict on
others.206 The corporation or its agents have not harmed the attorneys in
our scenerios; on the contrary, the attorneys are defendants in corporation
claims for malpractice. The attorney, moreover, is an agent of the
corporation, and “imputation does not furnish a basis on which an agent
may defend against a claim by the principal.”207 This general notion is
certainly sensible in the typical claim between principal and agent. If, for
example, the attorney fails to advise the client that the client does not have
to testify in a criminal matter, we would not impute to the client
knowledge of what the attorney knew or should have known to support a
defense by the attorney to the client’s malpractice claim. Thus, why not
eliminate imputation entirely when corporations sue their attorneys for
malpractice in failing to discover or report executive wrongdoing?

205. As noted earlier, we have considered cases involving auditors and attorneys to sketch the
various approaches to imputation in large part because courts have not seen fit to distinguish the
auditor and attorney roles in evaluating the in pari delicto defense.
206. For a recent proposal to this effect, see Christine M. Shepard, Corporate Wrongdoing and
the In Pari Delicto Defense in Auditor Malpractice Cases: A New Approach, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
275, 337–38 (2012) (“Imputation functions properly to allow third parties to rely on their dealings
with a principal’s agent. It is not proper for the task of assigning fault to a corporation when the
corporation, as a plaintiff, seeks to recover from a third party who harmed it.”).
207. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 cmt. b (2006).
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First, we should be clear about the implications of “no imputation”
approach: it would effectively eliminate the in pari delicto defense in the
internal-gatekeeper setting unless the company has actual knowledge of its
agent’s wrongdoing.208 The in pari delicto defense asks whether the
plaintiff is guilty of intentional or criminal wrongdoing,209 and absent
imputation of the wrongful acts or knowledge of the executive (or other
employee)210 to the corporation, the corporation does not have the
requisite culpability to trigger an in pari delicto defense in our scenarios.
The in pari delicto defense is not designed to compare degrees of negligence
between the plaintiff and the defendant: comparative negligence does that
already, and if the goal is to provide grounds for dismissal of a case when
the plaintiff is “equal to more” negligent than the defendant, then modified
comparative negligence will accomplish precisely that.211 While the
corporation may itself have engaged in negligence in failing to conduct its
own monitoring efforts,212 that negligence cannot ground a law firm’s in
pari delicto defense. Because the “no imputation” approach would (absent
actual knowledge by the corporation) eliminate the in pari delicto defense
when attorneys are sued for failure to detect or report executive
wrongdoing, we should be confident that imputation serves no valid
purpose before categorically eliminating it in corporate malpractice claims.
As discussed earlier, we can distill three reasons for imputing the acts
and knowledge of executive wrongdoing to the corporation. First, under
what I have termed the “benefit–burden” rationale,213 the corporation
acts and gathers information through its agents, and thus it should be
208. We need not address the delicate questions surrounding when the corporation has
“actual” knowledge of its executive’s wrongdoing because our concern is with when and whether to
impute knowledge to the corporation. For example, while the board of directors’ knowledge of the
wrongdoing would no doubt constitute “actual” corporation knowledge of the wrongdoing, it is less
clear whether the knowledge of only one or a few members would suffice for such a finding.
209. E.g., Gen. Car & Truck Leasing Sys., Inc. v. Lane & Waterman, 557 N.W.2d 274, 279
(Iowa 1996) (“The culpability element of the {in pari delicto} doctrine requires that the plaintiff has
been guilty of illegal or fraudulent conduct.” (citing 27A Am.Jur.2d Equity § 132, at 611)).
210. I will use the terms “executive” and “employee” interchangeably throughout this
discussion since my proposed standard would apply to both.
211. See, e.g., 14 MAINE REV. STAT. § 156 (barring plaintiff from recovery if the plaintiff’s
negligence is equal to or greater than defendant’s).
212. Christine Shepard attempts to overcome this concern by arguing that “[i]f the
corporation’s reporting systems are inadequate to the goal of detecting and deterring insider fraud,
the corporation can fairly be deemed a ‘knowing and substantial participant’ in the fraud.” Christine
M. Shepard, Corporate Wrongdoing and the In Pari Delicto Defense in Auditor Malpractice Cases: A
New Approach, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 275, 328–29 (2012). With the arguable exception of
willful blindness, however, a corporation’s negligent monitoring is not tantamount to knowledge of
an executive’s wrongful act.
213. See supra Part IV. subsection B. n.199.
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accountable for its agents’ actions and knowledge with respect to claims
concerning a third party.214 The converse of this rationale also explains
the adverse-interest exception to imputation: “[I]t makes no sense to
charge a person with the actions or knowledge of someone purporting to
act as the person’s agent if the purported agent was not acting at all on that
person’s behalf.”215 Second, the corporation’s agents have a duty to
communicate with the principal, and thus we have reason to believe that
the principal will be informed when the agent is furthering wrongdoing in
the corporation’s name.216 Again, when the agent is stealing from the
corporation, we expect the agent not to fulfill this communication duty,
thus providing a second rationale for the adverse-interest exception.
Third, imputation will incentivize the corporation to select and monitor its
employees carefully.217 The question is whether any of these rationales
warrant imputation in our scenarios.
Although the first of these reasons for imputation is most compelling
when the corporation is sued by a third party for the wrongdoing of its
agents, it retains force in claims between the corporation and the attorney
for the latter’s failure to discover employee wrongdoing. As a general
matter, the corporation, which connects to the world through its agents,
ought to be attributed to the acts and knowledge of its agents.218
Although the attorney is an agent of the corporation, her failure concerns
information about the acts and knowledge of another corporation agent—
in our examples an executive who was hired and controlled by the
corporation and who benefits the corporation in his agency role. Thus,
imputation in this case is categorically distinct from imputation of
knowledge that is unique to the attorney in the self-incrimination example
offered above.
The second reason, which emphasizes that agents have duties to
communicate with their principals, applies not only to corporations but
also to attorneys, who also have duties to communicate with the principal
under the attorney-ethics rules219 and agency law.220 Thus, if there is

214. Christine M. Shepard, Corporate Wrongdoing and the In Pari Delicto Defense in Auditor
Malpractice Cases: A New Approach, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 275, 328–29 (2012).
215. Mark J. Loewenstein Imputation, The Adverse Interest Exception, and the Curious Case of
the Restatement (Third) of Agency, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 305, 317 (2013).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2013).
220. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11 (2006).
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reason to assume that executives are communicating with the corporation,
ipso facto, these reasons also apply to the attorney.
The third rationale creates dissonance as well. If we impute
information from agents to principals to incentivize the corporation’s
monitoring efforts, then we cannot ignore the often critical role that
attorneys play in helping the corporation monitor its affairs. A board of
directors has a duty to keep reasonably informed about corporate affairs
and to implement systems to monitor legal compliance.221 The board of
directors is not charged with day-to-day involvement in the operation of
the corporation. In order to satisfy its monitoring duties, a board must
establish systems and intermediates through which it can monitor
corporate affairs. By way of example, the board may conduct ethics
seminars, deploy anonymous tip lines, impose internal corporation
reporting rules for suspected wrongdoing, and retain investigative counsel
to explore allegations of wrongdoing. As a structural matter, the board—
distanced from day-to-day operations—can and, in fact, must rely on the
fulfillment by others of duties to discover and report executive or other
employee wrongdoing.222 The gatekeeping efforts of lawyers are an
important means by which the corporation fulfills this monitoring role.
Thus, even if we are persuaded that the benefit–burden rationale justifies
imputation in the scenario offered above, we can begin to see the wisdom
in crafting an exception that acknowledges the gatekeeping role of lawyers.
The challenge is to frame an imputation rule that recognizes that both the
corporation and the law firm have responsibilities for preventing executive
wrongdoing, and that these duties are often intertwined.
When the attorney expressly or impliedly assumes corporation
monitoring responsibilities, there are at least two reasons to question the
propriety of imputation to the corporation of the knowledge of executive
wrongdoing. First, such imputation will essentially eliminate the
attorney’s liability for failing to fulfill her express or implied duty. As a
result, the corporation will not be able to rely on a critical intermediary
necessary to fulfill its duty of care to monitor the corporation. Thus, the
“public-interest” exception223 to the in pari delicto defense warrants an
221. See 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS &
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(a)(1) (2008) (noting that the duty of care “includes the obligation to
make, or cause to be made, an inquiry when, but only when, the circumstances would alert a
reasonable director or officer to the need therefor”).
222. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, § 3.4 at 129–30 (1986) (describing the
“monitoring” model).
223. See Nisselson v. Lernout, 469 F.3d 143, 152 (1st Cir. 2006) (explaining the publicinterest exception).
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exception when gatekeepers fail in their monitoring role. Second, basic
notions of equitable estoppel militate against imputation. Although the
“elements” of equitable estoppel are fluid, “hypocrisy related to factual
matters from words, conduct, or even silence may result in an equitable
ban.”224 When a law firm has expressly or impliedly assumed a
gatekeeping role with respect to a matter, and the corporation reasonably
relies on counsel’s performance of that role, there is certainly irony if not
hypocrisy in its seeking to impute knowledge to the corporation of the very
information the law firm failed to discover or report. The doctrine of
equitable estoppel is especially apt here because in pari delicto is itself an
equitable doctrine.
The reasoning leads to the proposed standard, which I will term the
“gatekeeper imputation” exception. In malpractice claims by corporations
against their law firms for failures to discover or report executive
wrongdoing, courts should impute the acts and knowledge of the executive
to the corporation subject to the traditional adverse-interest exception and
a gatekeeper-imputation exception. The gatekeeper imputation exception
provides that when the law firm has expressly or impliedly assumed an
obligation to identify or report employee wrongdoing, then information that
would have been discovered had the law firm fulfilled that obligation should
not be imputed to the corporation for purposes of the in pari delicto defense. If
either the adverse-interest or the gatekeeper-imputation exception applies,
then courts should not impute knowledge of executive wrongdoing to the
corporation for purposes of the defense.
A lawyer expressly assumes a gatekeeping role when she agrees to
undertake an investigation or monitoring role. The more challenging
question is when a law firm impliedly takes on such a role. Given our
rationales for the gatekeeping exception, it seems that something more
than the duty of care alone should be required to imply such a duty.225
Drawing on the estoppel rationale, the law firm must have a strong enough
obligation to identify and report the wrongdoing, would it amount to
“hypocrisy” for it to seek to impute knowledge to the corporation of the
224. T. Leigh Anenson, The Triumph of Equity: Equitable Estoppel in Modern Litigation, 27
REV. LITIG. 377, 389 (2008).
225. By way of reminder, our question is not whether a breach of the duty of care would be
sufficient to ground a malpractice claim, which—of course—it would be if coupled with causation
and damages. Our question is whether counsel can interpose an in pari delicto defense to such a
malpractice claim. The in pari delicto defense, in turn, will depend on whether the executive’s
wrongdoing (or knowledge thereof) will be imputed to the corporation, rendering the latter equally
or more culpable, and therefore warranting dismissal of the malpractice claim. The gatekeeper
exception identifies a category of instances in which such imputation would be inappropriate.
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information it failed to report. Valid reasons to imply such a duty can be
derived from certain ethics rules, such as RPC 1.13 or, on my
interpretation, RPC 2.1, and statutory provisions, (such as the Sarbanes
Oxley reporting requirements) which require the attorney to undertake
specific investigation or reporting efforts in carefully delimited instances.
Conversely, ethics rules that are roughly analogous to the duty of care that
attaches to all representations, such as the competence and communication
requirements of RPC 1.1 and RPC 1.4, respectively, should not, standing
alone, trigger the gatekeeper imputation exception. Of course, the
proposed standard does not change the legal theory that grounds the
corporation’s claim against the law firm, which remains malpractice.
Instead, the proposal looks to the express or implied commitments of the
law firm (the latter measured by the law firm’s ethical and statutory
reporting duties) to determine when to impute knowledge of the
executive’s wrongdoing to the corporation.
The gatekeeper-imputation exception steers a principled path between
competing goals. It optimizes the corporation and lawyer’s monitoring
roles, without abandoning the normative claim that executive acts and
knowledge should presumptively be imputed to the corporation. It
acknowledges that corporations rely on gatekeepers to monitor their own
executives, and lawyers who undertake such duties, whether expressly or by
implication, must have incentives to perform properly. Corporations, in
turn, should be encouraged to use a variety of monitoring mechanisms to
prevent executive fraud, and if lawyers are categorically insulated from
liability for their gatekeeping efforts, then one valuable tool in the
corporation’s monitoring arsenal is eliminated.226 Even when the lawyer
is a part the corporation’s monitoring efforts, the corporation retains
incentives to pursue additional monitoring paths to reduce the risk of
liability to third parties, and the possible reduction of its claims against the
attorney on comparative negligence grounds.227
In addition, the gatekeeper-imputation exception eliminates the
anomalies of the current judicial approaches. While intuitively appealing,
the bad faith exception for imputation, adopted by some courts228 and
arguably embraced by the Third Restatement,229 calls for a deeper
226. While attorneys would remain disciplinarily accountable for such ethics breaches, as
David Luban notes, “aggrieved clients are more interested in obtaining malpractice damages than in
filing grievances.” DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 155 (2007).
227. See infra Part V subsection C.
228. See supra Part III subsection C.2.
229. See supra Part III subsection C. n.144–49.
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explanation of why the in pari delicto defense should no longer apply in
these circumstances. When an attorney represents an individual client, the
bad faith of the lawyer would not eliminate the in pari delicto defense,
which allows the defense when both plaintiff and defendant are engaged in
wrongdoing.230 So why should the attorney’s bad faith eliminate the
defense in the corporate setting? The answer is that when the attorney
engages in bad faith with an executive to commit fraud, the attorney is—
by definition—in possession of knowledge of executive wrongdoing that
should be disclosed to the corporation under Model 1.3(b) and other rules.
In other words, the attorney in this instance has failed in her implied
gatekeeping role. The attorney should not, in such instance, be the
beneficiary of imputation for the reasons that support the gatekeeperimputation standard proposed herein.
The gatekeeper-imputation exception also resolves the challenges
posed by the rejection of imputation in cases of negligence. As noted
above, the categorical rejection of imputation disregards the notion that
corporations should, absent a particularized exception, be charged with
knowledge of the wrongdoing of the executives they empower to act on
their behalf. Moreover, the abandonment of imputation in cases of
attorney negligence, without a special justification, would undermine the
equitable notion that grounds the in pari delicto defense in the first place.
The archetypal in pari delicto defense involves an individual client who
commits intentional wrongdoing and a negligent attorney. Thus the
question is why should we reject the defense categorically when the
attorney is negligent in working with a corporate agent who committed
intentional wrongdoing? The gatekeeper test offers a cabined answer:
individuals do not expressly or impliedly hire attorneys to monitor
themselves; corporations do. Thus, the proposed standard does not
categorically reject imputation for all instances of attorney negligence;
instead, the proposed imputation exception attaches when an attorney
undertakes an express or implied gatekeeping obligation.
By directing our inquiry toward the relation of an attorney’s
gatekeeping role to the corporation’s overall monitoring efforts, the
gatekeeper-imputation test invites courts to examine the attorney’s failings
with a discriminating eye. It distinguishes between types of attorney
failings in ways that until now have been overlooked. While negligence
alone should not be sufficient to eliminate imputation and, as a result, the

230. As noted earlier, one rationale for the defense is that courts do not wish to referee between
wrongdoers. See supra Part III. subsection A. n.58.
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in pari delicto defense, negligence in an express or implied gatekeeping role
should be. By looking to the attorney’s ethical and statutory gatekeeping
roles to determine when an attorney has an implied gatekeeping
obligation, the proposed test brings nuance to an area of the law that has
long been characterized by categorical and inconsistent approaches. The
next section will consider how these distinctions would play out in practice
under the proposed test.
B. The Exception Applied
To gain some understanding of how the gatekeeper-imputation test
might apply in concrete circumstances, we will return to the hypotheticals
set forth in Part I. The examples will allow us to consider when an
attorney has expressly or impliedly agreed to a gatekeeping role, and how
the gatekeeping exception relates to the adverse-interest exception.
The most obvious instance in which corporations retain lawyers to play
an important role in monitoring efforts is when they do so expressly.
Consider Hypothetical D, in which the corporation hired the attorney to
conduct an internal corporate investigation of alleged, ongoing
malfeasance by certain of the corporation’s executives. If the law firm fails
to uncover such wrongdoing, and such failing is the result of malpractice
or some greater failing, then we would not impute the knowledge of the
wrongdoing to the corporation in a claim between the corporation and the
law firm for such failing. The law firm was hired expressly for the
gatekeeping function, and for reasons described earlier, the law firm’s
negligence in furthering an expressly undertaken gatekeeping role should
deprive it of the in pari delicto defense. While this is an instance in which
it would strain credulity to insulate the law firm from liability, the
traditional imputation standards—imputation absent an adverse interest—
provide no conceptual room for an exception and would dictate an
untenable outcome.
Of course, a corporation could expressly retain a law firm to perform
an internal-gatekeeping role even in the absence of reasons to initiate an
internal investigation. Thus, while uncommon, the retention agreement
between the attorney and the law firm could state that the firm is being
retained to monitor corporate affairs, whether generally or with respect to a
particular division or certain specified aspects or transactions of the
business. In such instance, a law firm that was negligent in its monitoring
role should not be allowed to interpose the in pari delicto defense for
failings related to such express undertaking.
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Conversely, the parties could limit the law firm’s liability for breaches
of gatekeeping duties by express agreement.231 An advantage of the
proposed standard is that it encourages corporations and law firms to
address in advance whether and to what extent the law firm is expected to
perform a gatekeeping role. When the parties agree on this role, there is
rarely reason for courts not to respect their allocation of responsibility by
and between themselves. Essentially, the advance agreement allows the
corporation to deploy the law firm in furtherance of the corporation’s
monitoring duties as much or as little as it wishes, provided the retained
law firm agrees to it. An agreement to limit the gatekeeping role of the law
firm should be ratified by the board of directors to lessen the risk that an
executive bent on wrongdoing might jettison the lawyer’s gatekeeper role
as a part of his wrongdoing scheme.
When the corporation retains a law firm for roles other than internal
investigations, it often does not direct the law firm to engage in a discovery
and reporting role in the engagement letter. For example, a law firm
might be engaged to handle a transaction or provide counseling services on
a specific issue or an array of issues. Given the parties’ silence on the issue,
courts should, as noted above, look to the source and nature of the
attorney’s duties to determine whether the attorney has an implied
gatekeeping function, thereby eliminating the in pari delicto defense. For
example, in Hypothetical A, the law firm knew of the executive’s planned
criminal or fraudulent scheme but did not report this fact to the board of
directors of the corporation. Here, the lawyer has breached RPC 1.13(b),
which expressly obligates the attorney to undertake the internalgatekeeping role in this circumstance.232 In addition, under section 307
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,233 an attorney who discovers evidence
of the company’s “material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary
duty or similar violation” must report it to the company’s chief legal
counsel or the chief executive officer and, failing an adequate response, to
an audit or independent committee of the board of directors or the entire
board.234 If the reporting attorney fails to receive an “appropriate

231. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h)(1) (2013). The argument would not
release the attorney from her ethical and statutory reporting obligations; it would extend only to
liability for malpractice, which can be adjusted in advance by agreement subject to the conditions set
forth in RPC 1.8(h)(1). Id.
232. See supra Part I.
233. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006) (setting forth rules of professional responsibility for attorneys).
234. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006); see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 205.2(e) (2010) (defining “evidence of material violation”).
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response,” he must report higher within the client organization.235 Given
the ethical and/or statutory reporting obligations on these facts, it is fair to
conclude that the lawyer had an implied duty to serve as a gatekeeper on
these facts, and imputation would not be appropriate.
Hypothetical B presents a closer question, given the interpretative
challenges posed by ethics and statutory standards in question. In B, the
attorney had reason for suspicion of executive criminal or fraudulent
wrongdoing but intentionally choose not to ask follow-up questions. The
attorney turned a blind eye to the allegations to avoid converting suspicion
into “knowledge” of wrongdoing and therefore being required to report on
the executive’s wrongful design. In this instance, it is clear that the
attorney did not have the requisite knowledge to trigger a duty to report
the executive’s wrongdoing to the board of directors under RPC 1.13.
The attorney’s obligations under Sarbanes-Oxley are triggered when
counsel “becomes aware of evidence of a material violation” of the
client.236 If “awareness” under Sarbanes-Oxley is akin to “knowledge”237
then the attorney’s reporting obligation would not be trigged under the
statute on these facts. As discussed earlier, however, the law firm on my
proposed interpretation has breached the duty of investigation implied by
RPC 2.1.238 An attorney, on this view, does not exercise independent,
professional judgment when she willfully ignores information suggesting
that a transaction she is about to further is criminal or fraudulent. Once
again, the ethical breach signals the gatekeeper-imputation exception of the

235. If the attorney does not believe that the response is appropriate, the attorney must then
report the material violation to the audit committee of the board of directors, to a committee of
independent directors, or to the entire board of directors. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(3) (specifying
when a lawyer shall report to if “an appropriate response within a reasonable time” is not provided).
The attorney is permitted to, but need not, report beyond the corporation in certain instances. See
generally William H. Volz & Vahe Tazian, The Role of Attorneys Under Sarbanes–Oxley: The Qualified
Legal Compliance Committee as Facilitator of Corporate Integrity, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 439, 443 (2006)
(devising a structure and procedure for monitoring corporations).
236. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(c) (specifying the procedure for reporting illegality when the
attorney is “aware of evidence of a material violation”); see also id. § 205.2(e) (“Evidence of a material
violation means credible evidence, based upon which it would be unreasonable, under the
circumstances, for a prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a
material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur.”).
237. Sarbanes-Oxley is implicated when the attorney becomes “aware” that what has or is
about to occur is evidently wrongful. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg.
51,715, 51,727 n.105 (Aug. 24, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, and 249) (“‘Aware’ is a
commonly used and well-defined English word, meaning ‘having knowledge; conscious;
cognizant.’”).
238. See supra Part II. subsection A. n.29–30.
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lawyer’s failing in the gatekeeping role in the corporation’s arsenal of
monitoring efforts.
Contrast the ethical breaches in hypotheticals A and B with the more
limited failings in C. In the latter scenario, the attorney unintentionally
but unreasonably overlooked signals that, if noticed, would have led her to
discover executive wrongdoing. Although the unreasonable failing could,
as noted earlier, ground a prima facie malpractice case by the corporation
against the attorney, the question is whether knowledge of the executive’s
wrongdoing should be imputed to the corporation under these
circumstances. The absence of an express undertaking to serve as a
gatekeeper coupled with the absence of a special ethical or statutory
obligation to discover and report on the ethical wrongdoing suggests that
the attorney’s reporting duties, in these circumstances, would not satisfy
the gatekeeper imputation exception.239 Thus, in this instance, the
attorney could successfully interpose an in pari delicto defense.
Let us turn finally to Hypothetical E, in which the employee’s
wrongdoing is directed at the corporation, whether in the form of theft
from the company or some variation on that theme. Here, the adverseinterest exception applies, and knowledge of the executive’s wrongdoing
would not be imputed to the corporation. As a result, the attorney would
not be able to interpose an in pari delicto defense. There is no reason to
invoke the gatekeeper exception in this scenario although it too might be
satisfied,240 since the adverse-interest exception eliminates imputation.
C. Gatekeeping and Comparative Negligence.
In those instances in which the gatekeeper imputation or adverseinterest exception applies and the law firm cannot invoke an in pari delicto
defense to a malpractice claim for its failure to discover an executive’s
wrongdoing, the remaining question is how the corporation’s failings, if
any, should bear on its malpractice claim against counsel. The simple
answer is that the corporation’s recovery should be reduced by its own
negligence under principles of comparative negligence.241 In this section,
we will examine how comparative negligence would play out in a failed
239. As noted earlier, only ethics rules that impose specific gatekeeping duties should ground
such implied duties, and not the general competence or communication requirements of RPC 1.1
and 1.4, respectively. See supra Part V. subsection A.
240. See discussion of Hypothetical E in Part I. subsection B.
241. See RONALD MALLEN, JEFFREY SMITH & ALLISON RHODES, LEGAL MALPRACTICE
§ 22.2 n.7 (2014) (listing jurisdictions that allow attorneys to seek to reduce malpractice recovery
based on the comparative negligence of the client).
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gatekeeper malpractice claim. Thus, the challenge here is what would
constitute evidence of negligence on the part of the board of directors in
the absence of actual or implied knowledge of the executive’s planned
wrongdoing.242
The corporation’s failings to monitor could take a variety of forms. For
example, the board might have failed to install other monitoring
procedures or systems that would enable it to learn of wrongdoing. It may
have created an environment where wrongful behavior was either ignored
or tacitly rewarded by emphasizing profit and disregarding legal and ethical
boundaries. It may have refused to create channels for others to report on
the executive’s behavior or punished those who took such action in the
past. The particulars notwithstanding, a corporation can share the blame
for the failure to discover its own executive’s intentional or criminal
wrongdoing—and comparative negligence would, in such case, reduce its
recovery against counsel.
The relative negligence of the corporation and the law firm may also
vary with the reasonable expectations of the parties regarding their
monitoring roles. For example, when a corporation has expressly
identified a problem for investigation by counsel, it may be reasonable for
the corporation to substantially reduce its own investigative efforts on the
question. In such instance, its own failings to investigate the matter
should not reduce its recovery. On the other hand, when the law firm is
only impliedly a gatekeeper, a jury could reduce the corporation’s recovery
against counsel for the corporation’s failure to undertake its own,
independent monitoring efforts. The judgment would be fact sensitive.
Courts frequently justify the imputation to the corporation of
knowledge of executive wrongdoing on the grounds that it will incentivize
the corporation to monitor its agents. As noted earlier, however, the
imputation of such knowledge can eliminate the incentive of law firms to
perform their role properly, since imputation can insulate the law firm
from liability under an in pari delicto defense. The gatekeeper imputation
exception therefore eliminates imputation in those situations in which the
attorney has expressly or impliedly undertaken a gatekeeping role,
preserving the strong incentive for law firms to perform their assumed
gatekeeping duties properly. The gatekeeper-imputation exception does
not eliminate the incentives of corporations to engage in monitoring,
242. The Hypotheticals assumed that the corporation who is suing for malpractice had no
actual knowledge of the executive’s criminal or fraudulent design. If it had, of course, then the in
pari delecto defense would apply without the need for imputation, and plaintiff’s claims would likely
be barred under the in pari delicto defense.
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however. Corporations will continue to be accountable to third parties
who are harmed by the executive wrongdoing, providing a strong incentive
to maintain controls and monitoring efforts rather than relying solely on a
contribution claim against counsel in defending such third-party claims.
Second, boards of directors have duties of care that require monitoring
regardless of imputation, which, in many instances will require a variety of
controls in addition to counsel reporting, especially when the law firm has
not expressly assumed a monitoring role. Thus, even when the gatekeeperimputation exception applies, the corporation’s recovery for malpractice
against its attorney will be subject to a comparative negligence defense,
which will direct jury inquiries into the nature and extent of the
corporation’s monitoring efforts.
CONCLUSION
I have proposed that we distinguish “external” gatekeeping, which
protects third parties from harm by the corporation client, from “internal”
gatekeeping, which protects the corporation from harm resulting from the
wrongdoing of its own executives or other employees. The distinction
allows us to isolate the challenges that are unique to the latter role, which
arise when corporations sue their lawyer for malpractice in failing to
prevent executives from engaging in crimes for fraud, often against third
parties, that ultimately result in substantial losses to the corporation.
When we impute knowledge of the executive’s wrongdoing to the
corporation, the in pari delicto defense essentially eliminates lawyer liability
for internal-gatekeeper failings. If the lawyer is categorically protected
from liability to the corporation for failures to report executive
wrongdoing, one can question whether the lawyer is an internal gatekeeper
by any measure that matters. Thus, the central question addressed by this
Article: when should the in pari delicto defense bar claims by corporations
against law firms for malpractice in their role as internal gatekeeper? A
review of the caselaw suggests that courts have not developed a clear or
coherent answer to this question.243
As a general matter, imputation and its adverse-interest exception seem
sensible. The corporation benefits from the acts of its agents, and should
suffer the burden of the wrongdoing that agents effect on its behalf.
Conversely, when the agent acts adversely to the corporation, we should
243. See supra Part III. Subsection C.; see also Christine M. Shepard, Corporate Wrongdoing and
the In Pari Delicto Defense in Auditor Malpractice Cases: A New Approach, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
275, 316–18 (2012) (noting that the correct application of the in pari delicto defense remains
unclear).
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not impute knowledge of such wrongdoing to the corporation. These
principles, though generally correct, fail to capture another concern,
however: attorneys are often a critical part of the corporation’s means of
monitoring its own agents. Thus, the imputation rule and adverse-interest
exception are a good start, but, standing alone, they fail to engage and
reconcile the competing reasons to impute and reject imputation in the
attorney gatekeeper setting.
This Article proposes a second exception to the imputation rule. In
addition to adverse-interest exception, attorneys should also be subject to a
“gatekeeper-imputation” exception. When the law firm has expressly or
impliedly assumed an obligation to identify or report employee wrongdoing,
then information that would have been discovered had the law firm fulfilled
that obligation should not be imputed to the corporation for purposes of the in
pari delicto defense. A law firm expressly assumes a gatekeeping role when
it agrees to undertake an investigation or monitoring role. Gatekeeping
duties are implied when required by the attorney’s ethical or statutory
obligations.
In each of the hypotheticals discussed in Part I, the attorney’s failings to
investigate, discover, or report information are breaches of the duty of care.
The failings, however, differ on closer examination. They differ in
whether the investigative role was express or implied, and whether the
failings involved ethical or statutory obligations to investigate and report.
These distinctions have been overlooked by courts, which have tended to
disregard the type of lawyer failing in their imputation analysis. The
proposed standard invites courts to consider these distinctions in assessing
when to allow lawyers to interpose an in pari delicto defense.
The gatekeeper-imputation test allows the corporation and the client to
adjust their rights and responsibilities by advance agreement. In the
absence of an express understanding or undertaking, courts can find an
implied gatekeeping duty in certain, carefully delimited circumstances.
The attorney’s negligence, standing alone, is not sufficient to invoke the
gatekeeper-imputation exception. When lawyers breach their ethical and
statutory duties to investigate, discover and/or report employee crimes and
fraud, the exception would apply, and imputation would not be
appropriate in corporation claims against the attorney for malpractice in
failing to discover or report the wrongdoing in question. When the
attorney’s information discovery and reporting roles, though negligent, are
not breaches of attorney’s ethical or statutory gatekeeping requirements,
lawyers should be allowed to interpose an in pari delicto defense. When
imputation is not appropriate, the corporation’s recovery for malpractice
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will be reduced by a comparative negligence defense, which will direct jury
inquiries into the nature and extent of the corporation’s monitoring efforts
beyond counsel.
Courts frequently justify imputation to the corporation of knowledge of
executive wrongdoing on the grounds that it will incentivize the
corporation to monitor its agents.244 As noted earlier, however, the
imputation of such knowledge can reduce the incentive of law firms to
perform their internal-gatekeeping role, since imputation can insulate the
law firm from liability under an in pari delicto defense. The gatekeeperimputation exception respects the normative basis for imputation, while
incentivizing corporation boards of directors to maintain internal controls
and lawyers to satisfy their ethical and statutory internal-gatekeeping
duties.

244. See In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 965 A.2d 763, 826 (Del. Ch. 2009) (discussing imputation
and how it “incentivizes independent directors and even stockholders to be effective monitors of
managerial behavior”).

